Pacificorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 38307 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-18-2011
Pacificorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission Clerk's
Record Dckt. 38307
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Pacificorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission Clerk's Record Dckt. 38307" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3112.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3112








IDAHO TATET OMMI SIO 
T. 
AppeO/M from lire Di Irici ("01111 of 11,t' /' 011111, Jllflldo/ 
Di tr, I oft"" Inlr of Moho. In ond for A VA 01111/) 
tfu,.""y.lo" Appl'lIol/l 
DAVlD J. RAPO 




IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38307 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE GEORGE D. CAREY 
LAWRENCE G. ALLEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
DAVID J. CRAPO 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... PAGE NO. 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS .............................................................................................................. 3 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, FILED SEPTEMBER 24,2008 ....................................... 8 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, FILED OCTOBER 20, 2008 ............................................................................ 23 
PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION, FILED JUNE 22, 2009 .................................... .28 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING MOTIONS IN LIMINE, FILED 
JUNE 28, 2010 ................................................................................................................... 36 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FILED 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 50 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 1,2010 ........... 69 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 1, 2010 ........................................................................ 71 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION IN OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 14, 2010 ................................................. 74 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S REPLY BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 19, 2010 ...................................................................... 80 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 19, 2010 .................................................................................. 84 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2010 ............................................................... 88 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED DECEMBER 13, 2010 .......................................... 94 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................. 100 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................. 101 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................ .102 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14,2011 ............................................ .103 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS ................................................................................................... 104 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................... PAGE NO. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 107 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD .................................................................................................... 108 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 11 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD .................................................... PAGE NO. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED DECEMBER 13,2010 .......................................... 94 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS ................................................................................................... 104 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 107 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD .................................................................................................... 108 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S REPLY BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 19, 2010 ...................................................................... 80 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, FILED OCTOBER 20, 2008 ........................................................................... .23 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 19, 2010 .................................................................................. 84 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING MOTIONS IN LIMINE, FILED 
JUNE 28, 2010 .................................... , .......................................................... '" ................. 36 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 1, 2010 ........................................................................ 71 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, FILED 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2010 ..................................................................................................... 50 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 1,2010 ........... 69 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, FILED NOVEMBER 24, 2010 ............................................................... 88 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................ .100 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................ .101 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................ .102 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED, FILED APRIL 14, 2011 ............................................. 103 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, FILED SEPTEMBER 24,2008 ....................................... 8 
PROTECTNE ORDER GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION, FILED JUNE 22, 2009 ..................................... 28 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS .............................................................................................................. 3 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD i 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD .................................................... PAGE NO. 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION IN OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED JUDGMENT, FILED OCTOBER 14, 2010 ................................................. 74 
INDEX TO THE CLERK'S RECORD ii 
Date: 4/14/2011 JUdicial District Court - Ada User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 11:48 AM ROA Report 
Page 1of5 Case: CV-OC-2008-18158 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Pacificorp vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Pacificorp vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User Judge 
9/24/2008 NCOC CCRANDJD New Case Filed - Other Claims Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PETN CCRANDJD Petition for Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
SMFI CCRANDJD Summons Filed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/2/2008 HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Status 11/07/200802:30 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PM) Phone 
10/10/2008 AFOS CCAMESLC Affidavit Of Service 10/2/08 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/17/2008 ROTS MCBIEHKJ Request For Trial Setting Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/20/2008 RSPS CCAMESLC Response to Petition for Judicial Review (Shaner Kathryn A. Sticklen 
for State) 
11/10/2008 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status held on 11/07/2008 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held Phone 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Kathryn A. Sticklen 
01/16/200903:00 PM) Phone no stipulation 
1/7/2009 CHRT CCKENNJA Changed Assigned Judge: Retired (batch 
process) 
1/16/2009 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status by Phone held on George Carey 
01/16/200903:00 PM: Hearing Held Phone no 
stipulation 
1/20/2009 ORDR CCKENNJA Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial George Carey 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
01/07/201004:30 PM) Phone 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 01/20/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM) 3 Days 
2/1212009 STSC CCDWONCP Stipulation For Scheduling And Planning Richard D. Greenwood 
4/23/2009 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
5/26/2009 MISC CCANDEJD Petitioners Disclosure of Expert Witnesses Richard D. Greenwood 
CESV CCANDEJD Certificate Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCANDEJD Motion for Limited Admission Richard D. Greenwood 
6/4/2009 CERS CCGARDAL Certificate Of Service 6.2.09 Richard D. Greenwood 
6/5/2009 ORDR CCKENNJA Order Granting Motion for Limited Admissions Richard D. Greenwood 
6/19/2009 STIP CCLYKEAL Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order Govering Richard D. Greenwood 
the Production and Use of Confidential 
Documents and Information 
6/22/2009 ORDR CCKENNJA Protective Order Governing the Production and Richard D. Greenwood 
Use of Confidential Dcouments and Information 
6/25/2009 HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/13/200903:30 Richard D. Greenwood 
PM) 
7/13/2009 INHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status held on 07/13/2009 Richard D. Greenwood 
03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
7/16/2009 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Court Trial held on 01/20/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 3 Days 00003. 
HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
01/07/201004:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Phone 
Date: 4/14/2011 
Time: 11:48 AM 
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Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial Richard D. Greenwood 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
06/28/201003:15 PM) Def counsel to initiate call 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 07/12/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM) 5 Days 
Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
Joint Status Report of the Parties Richard D. Greenwood 
Notice Of Filing Deposition on Written Questions Richard D. Greenwood 
Petitioner's First Motion in Limine Regarding Richard D. Greenwood 
Petitioner's Burden of Proof at Trial and Request 
for Oral Argument 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's First Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in Limine Regarding Petitioner's Burden of 
Proof at Trial and Request for Oral Argument 
Petitioner's Second Motion in Limine to Prohibit Richard D. Greenwood 
the Introduction of the Report Perpared by D. 
Brent Eyre at Trial and Request for Oral 
Argument 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Second Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in Limine to Prohibit the Introduction of the 
Report Perpared by D. Brent Eyre at Trial and 
Request for Oral Argument 
Notice Of Hearing re Petitioner's First Motion in Richard D. Greenwood 
Limine Regarding Petitioner's Burden of Proof at 
Trial and Petitioner's Second Motion in Limine to 
Prohibit the Introduction of the Report Perpared 
by D. Brent Eyre at Trial and Request for Oral 
Argument (06/17/10 @ 4pm) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
06/17/201004:00 PM) Petitioner's First Motion in 
Limine Regarding Petitioner's Burden of Proof at 
Trial and Petitioner's Second Motion in Limine to 
Prohibit the Introduction of the Report Perpared 
by D. Brent Eyre at Trial and Request for Oral 
Argument 
Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine to Richard D. Greenwood 
Prohibit Intro of Report by 0 Brent Eyre 
Memorandum in Response to Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
Reply Memo in Support of Petitioner's First Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in LImine regarding Petitioner's Burden of 
Proof at Trial 
00004 
Date: 4/14/2011 
Time: 11:48 AM 
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Pacificorp VS. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User 
6/15/2010 CCAMESLC 
6/17/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA 









7/1/2010 STIP CCSIMMSM 





7/14/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA 
Judge 
Reply Memo in Support of Petitioner's First Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in Limine to Prohibit the Introduction of the 
Preport Prepared by D Brent Eyre at Trial and 
Request for Oral Arguement 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on Richard D. Greenwood 
06/17/201004:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Idaho Tax Commissions Proposed Finding of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Pre Trial Conference Memorandum 
List of Exhibits 
Witness List 
Notice Of Service 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum and Order Concerning Motions in Richard D. Greenwood 
Limine 
Final Trial Witness List and Exhibit List 
Certificate Of Service 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
06/28/2010 03: 15 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: No reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: held in chambers 
Stipulation of Parties Excusing Richard J. Richard D. Greenwood 
Armstrong from Personally Appearing at Trial as 
Local Counsel 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 07/12/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Vanessa Gosney 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 07/14/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM) 2nd day of trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 07/15/2010 
09:00 AM) 3rd day of trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 07/16/2010 
09:00 AM) 4th day of trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 07/19/2010 
09:00 AM) 5th day of trial 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 07/14/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 pages 
00005 
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Pacificorp vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User Judge 
7/15/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Court Trial held on 07/15/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 pages 
7/16/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Court Trial held on 07/16/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Penny Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 pages 
7/1912010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Court Trial held on 07/19/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 pages 
8/9/2010 MISC MCBIEHKJ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Richard D. Greenwood 
Conclusions of Law 
9/16/2010 DEOP DCLYKEMA Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Richard D. Greenwood 
Conclusions of Law 
9/30/2010 NOCA CCGARDAL Notice Of Change Of Address Richard D. Greenwood 
10/1/2010 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion in Objection to Proposed Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCNELSRF Memorandum in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
10/14/2010 RSPN CCLATICJ Response to the Idaho State Tax Commission's Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in Objection to Proposed Judgment 
10/18/2010 BREF CCLATICJ Brief in Support of Verified Memorandum of Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCLATICJ Verified Memorandum of Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
10/19/2010 JDMT TCJOHNKA Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
CDIS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho State Tax Richard D. Greenwood 
Commission, Defendant; Pacificorp, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 10/19/2010 
STAT TCJOHNKA STATUS CHANGED: Closed Richard D. Greenwood 
REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Brief in Opposition to Proposed Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
10/27/2010 MOTN CCMASTLW Motion to Disallow Claimed Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCMASTLW Affidavit of Laurie J. Davies Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
11/3/2010 HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
11/22/2010 01 :30 PM) objection to cost bill 
STAT TCJOHNKA STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Richard D. Greenwood 
action 
NOTH TCJOHNKA Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
11/19/2010 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order for Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
11/22/2010 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
11/22/201001 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
00006 objection to cost bill 
STAT TCJOHNKA STATUS CHANGED: closed Richard D. Greenwood 
Date: 4/14/2011 
Time: 11:48 AM 
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Pacificorp vs. Idaho State Tax Commission 
Date Code User 
11/22/2010 NOTC CCLATICJ Notice of Firm Name Change and Entry of 
Appearance (David J. Crapo for Pacificorp) 
11/26/2010 APSC CCLUNDMJ Appealed To The Supreme Court 
12/1312010 AMEN CCLUNDMJ Amended Notice of Appeal 
4/14/2011 NOTC CCTHIEBJ (4) Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court 
Docket No. 38307 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Judge 
Richard D. GreenwoOd 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Greenwood 
00007 
J 
COUnty CierI' l~ Richard J. Arm1trong, ISB No. 5548 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
J DAVlO NAVARRO, Cieri< 
• J.RANOALL 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PACIFICORP, ) 
) PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petitioner, 
v. 










Judge _______ _ 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-409 and Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
1 
Procedure, PacifiCorp hereby submits, by and through its counsel, this Petition for Judicial 
Review and respectfully requests the Court to review the decision of the Idaho State Tax 
Commission (the "Tax Commission") concerning the 2008 ad valorem property tax assessment 
made against PacifiCorp's operating property located in the State ofIdaho. 
1. This Petition is PacifiCorp's appeal of the Decision of the Tax 
Commission issued on September 2, 2008 In the matter of the 2008 Operating Property Ad 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 1 
00008 
Valorem Valuation of PacifiCorp, Docket No. 21338 (the "Decision") in which the Tax 
Commission determined that the 2008 correlated system value for PacifiCorp's operating 
property was $8,877,075,014. A copy of the Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. As provided by Idaho Code § 63-409 and IRCP 84(b), the issues present 
in this Petition are to be heard by the District Court in a "trial de novo without a jury in the same 
manner as though it were an original proceeding in that court." Idaho Code § 63-409(1). 
3. The issue presented in this Petition is whether the 2008 assessed value 
determined by the Tax Commission for PacifiCorp's operating property in Idaho is erroneous. 
PacifiCorp believes that the Tax Commission's assessment is erroneous and excessive of the fair 
market value of its property. The valuation issues that will be presented in this matter will 
include, but may not be limited to, the following: 
a. While PacifiCorp appreciates the Tax Commission's recognition 
of obsolescence in the cost approach, it believes that the Tax Commission's cost indicator of 
value is overstated because it failed to fully account for all recognized items of economic and 
functional obsolescence, including, without limitation, any recognition of the effects of 
significant regulatory constraints, competition on the earning capacity and changes in technology. 
b. PacifiCorp believes that the Tax Commission's income indicator 
of value is overstated because the Tax Commission did not properly estimate the cost of equity in 
deriving its capitalization rate. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
c. The Tax Commission placed a 45% weight in its correlation on the 
cost indicator, and a 55% weight on the income indicator. Unless the cost approach is properly 
adjusted for the full amount of obsolescence, PacifiCorp believes that greater weight must be 
placed on the income indicator of value. 
4. The Decision appealed in this matter was issued as a result of a hearing 
that was held before the Tax Commission on August 21,2008. It is PacifiCorp's understanding 
that an audio tape recording of the hearing was made by the Tax Commission and the audiotape 
is in the possession of the Tax Commission. Inasmuch as this matter is to be heard as a "trial de 
novo" before this Court, PacifiCorp does not believe that the audio tape is necessary under IRCP 
84(j). Accordingly, no transcript of the proceeding is requested at this time and PacifiCorp has 
attached Exhibit A, the Tax Commission's September 2,2008 Decision, which is the entire 
record required in this matter. 
5. Pursuant to IRCP 84(d)(7), a copy of this Petition for Judicial Review is 
being served upon the Tax Commission through its counsel, Erick M. Shaner, Deputy Attorney 
General. Inasmuch as this proceeding is to be held as a "trial de novo as though it were an 
original proceeding," a Summons is also being served upon the Tax Commission. 
6. PacifiCorp respectfully requests the following relief: 
a. A Court order reducing the 2008 correlated system value against 
its property to approximately $7,719,615,918 or such lesser amount as may be determined at 
trial. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 3 
ooo~o 
b. A Court order pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-1305 requiring 
appropriate refunds and/or credits of the taxes paid by PacifiCorp as a result of the Tax 
Commission's excessive valuation. 
c. An order reimbursing PacifiCorp for its attorneys fees and costs 
associated with this matter, and such other relief as the Court my find appropriate. 
DATED this:l3e!. day of September, 2008. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 4 
000'1'1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ..tJlciay of September, 2008, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEWwas mailed in the U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Erick M. Shaner, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0410 
S\WPDATAIPLEADING\PACIFICORP IDAHO 20()8.PB'ITION FOR REVlEWwpd 




BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the matter of the 2008 












DOCKET NO. 21338 
DECISION 
This matter came for hearing before the State Tax Commission (Commission), on August 
21,2008, at 8:30 a.m. from a timely protest filed by the Petitioner, PacifiCorp (Petitioner). All 
members of the State Tax Commission were present for the hearing. David J. Crapo, Attorney at 
Law, represented the Petitioner, and present for the Petitioner were Norman K. Ross, Tax 
Director, and Dr. Gary C. Cornia, Doctorate in Finance and Professor of Public Management at 
the Marriott School of Business, Brigham Young University. Mr. Ross and Dr. Cornia testified 
on behalf of the Petitioner. Erick M. Shaner, Deputy Attorney General, represented the 
Commission's staff; present for the staff was J arott Rudd, Senior Appraiser. Mr. Rudd testified 
for the staff. 
The issues presented before the Commission were: 
• Whether the Petitioner is entitled to any adjustment for functional and economIC 
obsolescence in the cost approach. 
• Whether the capitalization rate applied in the appraisal by the Commission's staff correctly 
estimated the cost of equity. 
DECISION - 1 
rga/ss/21338 00014 
DISCUSSION OF THE CASE INCLUDING 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Petitioner is a "class 3" operating property, Idaho Code section 63-201(11). The 
Petitioner's operating property is annually assessable by the State Tax Commission pursuant to 
Article 7, section 12, of the Idaho Constitution and Chapter 4, Title 63, Idaho Code. The 
Petitioner operates hydroelectric and thermal generating plants in Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. The Petitioner provides electric 
transmission and distribution serving approximately 67,000 customers in 22 counties across 
southeastern Idaho. 
The value placed on property by the assessor in appraising property for ad valorem 
purposes (as reflected in the staff appraisal) is presumed correct. Merris v. Ada County, 100 
Idaho 59, 593 P.2d 394 (1979). The burden of proof is upon the taxpayer challenging such 
appraisal to show that he is entitled to relief. Ibid. 
The Commission's staff determined the 2008 system value for the Petitioner's operating 
property to be $9,273,982,721 and the Idaho taxable value to be $263,667,243. The 
Commission's staff arrived at this value after considering the cost, income, and stock and debt 
approaches to value, placing 45% weight on the cost approach to value and 55% weight on the 
income approach to value. No weight was placed on the stock and debt approach to value. 
1. The Cost Approach and Obsolescence. 
Mr. Crapo said that the staff s appraisal was erroneous because it did not include a 
deduction in its cost approach for functional and economic obsolescence. He asserted that a 
deduction for obsolescence must be included in the appraisal because Idaho Property Tax 
Administrative Rule 35.0l.03.405.05.c. states that the appraiser shall attempt to measure 
DECISION - 2 
rga/ss/21338 OOO~5 
obsolescence, if any exists, and if obsolescence is found to exist, it may be considered in the cost 
approach. Mr. Crapo further stated that obsolescence should be deducted because past decisions 
of the Commission found an indication of some degree of economic obsolescence because the 
Petitioner's earned rate of return was substantially below its allowed rate of return. Mr. Crapo 
stated other examples of obsolescence to be regulation and competition. Mr. Crapo presented 
various quotes pointing out that depreciation includes physical deterioration, functional 
obsolescence, and economic obsolescence and that all forms of depreciation must be considered 
and supported by market data. Other quotes presented by Mr. Crapo declared that net book 
values do not reflect market values and book values fail to take into account factors such as 
inflation or obsolescence. Mr. Crapo presented a chart showing that the average five-year return 
on equity for the Petitioner was 19.8% less than the average return on equity for many other 
regulated electric utilities and a chart showing the average five-year return on investment to be 
27.4% less than the average rate of return on investment for many other regulated electric 
utilities. Finally, Mr. Crapo presented a sheet showing the required rate of return to be 26.6% 
over a projected rate of return. He requested 26.6% obsolescence be deducted from the cost 
indicated value. 
Mr. Ross testified that he has prepared the charts showing the Petitioners average five-
year return on equity and the average five-year return on investment were below the averages for 
many regulated electric utility companies. He also testified that the Petitioner earns well below 
the allowed rate of return. Mr. Ross testified that being regulated by various regulatory bodies 
could contribute to obsolescence as could cost factors caused by servicing a very large area of 
110,000 square miles. He testified that poor management could contribute to poor earnings. 
However, the owners of the Petitioner believe management to be highly effective, so 
DECISION - 3 
rga/ss/21338 00016 
management was not a consideration in the cause of obsolescence for the Petitioner. He testified 
that the assets of the Petitioner are not underutilized. He testified that he believes that 26.6% 
should be deducted from the cost approach for obsolescence. He testified that the appraisal 
reports prepared by the Commission for the Hazelton B hydroelectric project and the Falls River 
hydroelectric project both showed a deduction for obsolescence. 
Dr. Cornia testified that obsolescence should be allowed for the Petitioner's operating 
property. He said that during his time as a Utah Tax Commissioner, he had been generally 
skeptical as to the existence of obsolescence; however, he has become convinced that it exists. 
He presented a graph showing that net utility income of major electrics has declined from 1995 
to 2006. He presented a chart showing a ratio analysis approach and a data envelopment analysis 
approach to measuring obsolescence. He said that the Petitioner was below the envelope 
indicating that obsolescence should be allowed for the company. He testified that income 
shortfall is a very appropriate way to measure obsolescence and that Commissioners could feel 
some comfort in allowing obsolescence based on income shortfall. 
Mr. Shaner stated that the appraisal of the Petitioner's company has been performed by 
Mr. Rudd in accordance with guidelines developed by the Western States Association of Tax 
Administrators (WSATA) as well as Idaho Code and Rules. Mr. Rudd presented and reviewed 
his cost approach appraisal and stated that he had used the historical cost less depreciation 
method. He testified that his appraisal did not show a specific amount for obsolescence because 
it was included in the depreciation amount. Mr. Rudd submitted various quotations stating that 
in the case of regulated utilities, the unadjusted book value is likely to be a reasonable value 
indicator and that the calculation of net book cost includes a deduction for physical deterioration 
and obsolescence caused by limiting the property's earning ability to a return on its net book 
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costs. Mr. Rudd testified to his agreement with the WASTA handbook, 1989, pg. 23 that the 
historical cost less depreciation (HCLD) is an important indicator of value for regulated 
companies and that a deduction for obsolescence is as inconsistent as adding value to HCLD 
because some of the company assets have increased in value since it was acquired. Mr. Rudd 
testified that in the 2007 appraisal he weighted the cost approach at 45% rather than the 50% that 
had been used in prior years because of discussions with the Petitioner concerning the topic of 
obsolescence. Mr. Rudd testified that in preparing the 2008 appraisal he considered obsolescence 
but could not identify any above what he believed was already contained in the depreciation 
amount. He testified that since market was consistently above book value he concluded that 
there was no need to allow additional obsolescence. Mr. Rudd testified to other market 
indicators pointing to economic wellness of the Petitioner. He testified that the Petitioner's 
electric revenues increased from 2006 to 2007 by 13.24%, that the electric revenues for investor-
owned utilities increased by 5.5% during the same period, and that during this period operating 
incomes increased 3.3% overall for investor-owned electric utilities, while the Petitioner's 
operating revenues increased 19.6%. Mr. Rudd testified that based on information from the 
Edison Electric Institute, the highest growth rates in U.S. electric output came from the Rocky 
Mountain and Pacific Northwest region at 6.4% and 5.1 %, respectively, and that both capacity 
and generation increased for the Petitioner from 2006 to 2007. Mr. Rudd presented a definition 
of depreciation from the Code of Federal Regulations (18 CFR Part 101) emphasizing that 
obsolescence, changes in the art, changes in demand, and requirements of public authorities are 
to be considered in the causes of depreciation. He also presented a list from an August 1996 
pUblication of the National Association of Regulatory Commissioners showing some factors that 
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should be included in depreciation. The list includes the effects of regulation and technical and 
economic obsolescence. 
2. The Cost of Equity. 
Mr. Crapo stated that he believed there to be an error in the estimate of the cost of equity. 
Mr. Ross testified that he believed the 10.45% equity yield rate as used in the appraisal was too 
low. Mr. Ross presented a chart showing the equity yield rates used by eight state tax 
jurisdictions. He showed that the average rate of seven states (excluding Idaho) was 11.23% and 
that by using 11.23%, instead of the 10.45% in the weighted cost of capital calculation, the rate 
would be would 9.38%. Mr. Ross testified that 9.38% should be used in the appraisal as the 
capitalization rate. 
Mr. Rudd testified that the capitalization rate used in the appraisal was 8.89%. This is the 
rate that was estimated as the result of the 2008 Idaho Yield Rate Study for Electric Industry. 
3. Summary of Petitioner's Desired Adjustments to Value. 
Mr. Crapo pointed out that one of his numbers presented in the PowerPoint contained a 
math error. The corrected amount for the cost indicator after the deduction of 26.6% for 
obsolescence is $8,163,941,630. The amount for the capitalized income indicator of value after 
the correction of the capitalization rate to 9.38% is $7,356,076,700. The system correlated value 
is $7,719,615,918. 
CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION 
Based upon a thorough review of the evidence submitted at the hearing for this specific 
operating property belonging to the Petitioner, the Commission concludes the system value shall 
be set at $8,877,075,014 for ad valorem tax purposes. Accordingly, we order the Idaho taxable 
value for the tax year 2008 to be $252,382,819 as shown on the Pacificorp system correlation 
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sheet attached herewith and showing the estimated Idaho valuation of the Petitioner to be 
$252,382,819. This was based on a finding of the Commission that 7.93% be deducted tor 
obsolescence from the cost approach indicator of value of $11,122,536,280. 
Idaho Code section 63-409 provides that any Petitioner aggrieved by a State Tax 
Commission decision assessing a Petitioner's operating property may file an appeal to the Ada 
County District Court or to the district court in the county in which such operating property is 
located, if located in only one county, within thirty (30) days after service upon the Petitioner of 
this decision of the Commission. 
DATED this ,2 nd day of September, 2008. 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of September, 2008, a copy of the within and 
foregoing DECISION was served by sending the same by United States mail, postage prepaid, in 
an envelope addressed to: 
NORMAN KROSS 
PACIFICORP 
825 NE MULTNOMAH ST SUITE 1900 
PORTLAND OR 97232-4107 
D A VrD J CRAPO 
WOOD CRA.PO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
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INDICATORS OF VALUE WEIGHT AMOUNT 
COST (page 3) 
CAPIT AUZED INCOME (page 4) 
MARKET (page 5) 
System Correlation: Based on the above indicators, my conclusion of value is: 
Deduct: Intangible Personal Property 
Custom software 
Franchises 
Contracts (Weatherization Loans) 
Licenses 
Adjusted System Value 
Idaho Allocation Factor (page 8) 
Idaho Allocated Value 
Add: leased Equipment (page 9) 
Deduct: Licensed Vehicles 
Deduct Business Inventory Exemption 
Subtotal 
Deduct Irrigation Exemption 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
----------------------------) 
The Idaho State Tax Commission (Tax Commission) issued a decision on September 2, 
2008, regarding the valuation ofPacifiCorp's operating property for Idaho property tax purposes. 
On September 24, 2008, PacifiCorp filed a Petition for Judicial Review with this Court to appeal 
the decision of the Tax Commission. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-409, the appeal brought by 
PacifiCorp is a de novo appeal to be considered by the Court without ajury. 
PacifiCorp served the Tax Commission with the Petition and Summons on October 2, 
2008. Pursuant to this Court's Summons, the Tax Commission, by and through its legal counsel, 
now responds to PacifiCorp's Petition for Judicial Review. 
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l. GENERAL RESPONSE 
The Petition fails to state a ground upon which relief can be granted and must be 
dismissed by this Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
(I.R.C.P.). The Petition fails to allege sufficient facts to support PacifiCorp's claim for property 
tax exemption or reductions in the assessed value ofPacifiCorp's operating property. 
II. SPECIFIC RESPONSES 
The Tax Commission specifically responds to the factual allegations in each paragraph of 
the Petition for Judicial Review as set forth below and denies each and every allegation in the 
Petition not specifically admitted herein. 
1. The Tax Commission admits the factual allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the 
Petition. As indicated in Exhibit A of the Petition, the Tax Commission issued a decision in this 
matter that established the value of PacifiCorp's operating property for the assessment of Idaho 
property taxes. 
2. The Tax Commission admits the factual allegations in Paragraph 2 of the Petition. 
The present appeal brought by PacifiCorp is a de novo appeal to be considered by the Court 
without a jury. Because this is a de novo matter, the usual civil discovery and trial procedures 
apply to this case. 
However, the Tax Commission denies that issues presented in this appeal, but not 
presented to the Tax Commission sitting as the State Board of Equalization, can be heard by this 
Court. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-409, the issues in this case are limited to those Issues 
PacifiCorp presented to the State Board of Equalization. 
3. The Tax Commission denies that it erred when it determined the fair market value of 
PacifiCorp's operating property as alleged in Paragraph 3 of the Petition. The Commission 
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specifIcally responds to each subissue raised in paragraph 3 of the Petition for Judicial Review as 
follows: 
3. a. The Tax Commission denies the allegations contained in paragraph 3. a. of the 
Petition. The Tax Commission denies that PacifICorp is entitled to an additional 
reduction in the assessed valuation of the Company's operating property based on 
economic and functional obsolescence. The Tax Commission properly accounted for all 
forms of obsolescence in determining the value of PacifiCorp's operating property 
pursuant to the cost indicator of value and specifically reduced the cost indicator to 
account for economic obsolescence. An additional valuation reduction is not warranted 
for functional or economic obsolescence. 
3. b. The Tax Commission denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3. b. of 
the Petition. The Tax Commission's income indicator of value is properly stated and the 
proper estimate of the cost of equity was used in deriving the capitalization rate. 
3. c. The Tax Commission denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3. c. of the 
Petition. The Tax Commission's cost approach was properly adjusted for the full amount 
of obsolescence. The correct weight was placed on the income indicator of value. 
4. The Commission admits the factual allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the 
Petition. The Commission sitting as the State Board of Equalization conducted a hearing in this 
matter on August 21, 2008. The hearing was recorded for deliberation by the Commissioners 
participating in the decision. 
The Tax Commission also agrees with PacifiCorp's conclusions that because the appeal 
before this Court is de novo, a transcript of the proceedings conducted by the Tax Commission is 
not required. However, the Tax Commission reserves the right to rely upon a transcription 
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should a transcript prove necessary to document matters asserted at the hearing before the State 
Board of Equalization. 
The Tax Commission also notes that because this appeal is a de novo appeal, this Court is 
not limited to reviewing only the evidence submitted at the administrative hearing. Rather, this 
Court may consider new evidence and make its own determination regarding any valuation issue 
that PacifiCorp presented to the Board of Equalization. 
5. The Tax Commission admits that it has been served with the Petition for Judicial 
Review and a Summons pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4. 
6. The Tax Commission denies that PacifiCorp is entitled to a reduction in the assessed 
value of its operating property and the attendant requested refunds, credits or reimbursements, as 
alleged in Paragraph 6 of the Petition. Pacificorp is not entitled to reimbursement of its 
attorneys' fees and costs associated with this matter. 
III. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Petition for Judicial Review states that the issues set forth in this matter "will 
include, but may not be limited to, the following" issues listed in the Petition. To the extent 
PacifiCorp wishes to amend its Petition or otherwise present additional issues, the Tax 
Commission notes that pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-409, PacifiCorp may only appeal those 
issues it presented to the Tax Commission sitting as the State Board of Equalization. 
Consequently, any count in an amended petition or additional issue otherwise raised in this 
appeal, but not raised below, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 




WHEREFORE, the Respondent, the Idaho State Tax Commission, asks this Court for the 
following relief: 
1. Dismiss PacifiCorp's Petition for Judicial Review for failure to state a ground upon 
which relief can be granted; 
2. AftIrm the Decision of the Tax Commission and enter a judgment against PacifiCorp; 
3. Order PacifiCorp to pay all of the Tax Commission's costs and reasonable attorneys' 
fees incurred in defending this action; and 
4. Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems reasonable and necessary to 
accomplish the demands of justice. 
DATED this a'!fay of October 2008. 
ERICK M. SHANER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /1 ~ay of October 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO 
PETITON FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, and addressed to each of the following: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
DAVID J CRAPO 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ERICK M. SHANER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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CASE NO. CV -OC-08 18158 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION 
AND USE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS AND 
INFORMA TION 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties that some information sought and to be produced 
by the parties during discovery in this action likely will represent or contain confidential 
financial or commercial information within the meaning of Rule 26( c)(7) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: 
1. MA TTERS PROTECTED. 
(a) Except as hereinafter provided, documents produced by any party after entry 
of this Order may be designated by the producing party by stamping "[Name of Producing Party 
or unique prefix] -- "CONFIDENTIAL" on each page of such material in a manner that does not 
obscure information on the page. Documents so designated, regardless of whether produced 
voluntarily, pursuant to subpoena, or order of the court, shall be used or disclosed by the party or 
person receiving the document for purposes of this litigation only, and shall not intentionally be 
disclosed, made available, or disseminated except as permitted by this Order. 
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(b) In addition to the "Confidential" designation referred to in Paragraph 1 (a), 
above, a provider of Documents may claim that Confidential Documents are also "Highly 
Sensitive" Documents because they contain "Highly Sensitive" information." Confidential 
Documents or Highly Sensitive Documents so designated by either party will be made available 
for review by persons identified in paragraphs 5(a) and (b), below, and will be made available at 
reasonable times and places as agreed to by the parties. The reviewing persons shall not be 
allowed to take verbatim notes when reviewing Highly Sensitive Documents or information, but 
they shall be allowed to take notes regarding the general tenor of the requested Documents or 
information in order to be able to provide a factual and legal basis to opposing counsel and/or the 
Court as to why the information should be provided. The reviewing persons may also mark 
pages of any such materials with a post-it note for which they would like to obtain a copy. Upon 
receiving the request for a copy of specific pages of Highly Sensitive Documents, the providing 
party will review the requested page(s) and determine (1) whether a copy of the page may be 
provided under the protections of this Protective Order as a Confidential document, (2) whether a 
copy of the page may be redacted and then provided under the protections of this Protective 
Order as a Confidential document, (3) whether a copy may be provided subject to the protections 
of the Protective Order and additional protective measures, (4) whether a copy may be provided 
because it is not Confidential or Highly Sensitive; or (5) whether a copy may not be provided. 
The providing party will communicate its determination to the requesting party with an 
explanation for its determination and the additional protective measures, if any. The requesting 
party may agree to the determination and/or additional protective measures, or it may petition 
and oppose the determination or proposed alternative protective measures. Disputes between the 
parties shall be resolved pursuant to the Court Order pursuant to Paragraph l(c), below. Where 
the word CONFIDENTIAL is used in this order, it shall also mean, HIGHLY SENSITIVE, if 
applicable. 
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(c) A party's designation of any "Document" produced by it as CONFIDENTIAL 
shall remain in effect until the written release of that party is given or until the Court orders 
otherwise. If any party challenges any other party's designation of a "Document" as 
CONFIDENTIAL, the challenging party may, after first meeting and conferring with the 
designating party, bring a motion seeking entry of an order withdrawing the designated 
"Document" from being CONFIDENTIAL. In deciding such a motion, the party seeking to 
designate the "Document" as CONFIDENTIAL shall bear the burden under Idaho law of 
establishing to the Court's satisfaction that the challenged "Document" contains confidential, 
competitive, and/or proprietary information or trade secrets that need to be protected under the 
provisions of this Order. 
(d) All pleadings, affidavits, motions, briefs, and memoranda and exhibits offered in 
support thereof which incorporate or refer to any "Document" designated CONFIDENTIAL 
shall be treated as CONFIDENTIAL and protected pursuant to this Order. 
(e) Testimony, including the transcripts thereof, of the parties, their agents, 
employees, and consultants, given in depositions or proceedings in this litigation concerning or 
relying on any "Document" designated CONFIDENTIAL shall be protected pursuant to this 
Order if designated as confidential by the party, or its counsel, on the record at the deposition or 
other proceeding, or in writing within ten days after receiving the transcript of such testimony. 
(f) The appraisal conducted by the Idaho State Tax Commission, the reports 
PacifiCorp filed with the Commission as required by statute, the Petition for Hearing and for 
Reduction of 2008 Operating Property Assessed Valuation PacifiCorp submitted to the Tax 
Commission, the exhibits filed in support of the petition submitted to the Tax Commission, and 
correspondence between the parties between the time of the petition and the issuance of the 
Idaho State Tax Commission's Decision in this matter are not and will not be deemed 
confidential for purposes of this Order. 
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(g) Documents that are public record are not and will not be confidential. This 
includes, but is not limited to, documents available on Web sites; documents filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and/or the Federal Communications Commission and 
available to the public; press releases; and company magazines and publications that are 
distributed to groups of company employees without restriction on dissemination by such 
employees. 
(h) Within 90 days after the conclusion of this litigation by settlement or final 
judgment, all documents in the possession of a party that were designated or protected as 
"CONFIDENTIAL" and all copies thereof shall be returned to counsel for the party that 
originally produced the documents. Alternatively, with the written consent of the producing 
party, the party obligated to return may deliver the Documents to a contract shredder for 
destruction and certify in writing to having done so. The provisions of this Order shall survive 
the concl usion of this litigation. 
(i) Written notices between the parties under this Order may be given by electronic 
mail. 
2. THE TERM "DOCUMENT" DEFINED. 
(a) "Document" for the purpose of this order includes but is not limited to originals, 
duplicates and reproductions of correspondence, memoranda, notes, emails, reports, audio 
recordings, visual recordings, compilations, summaries, calculations, ledgers, charts, 
photographs, and all other papers, documents, testimony, and other matters reduced or capable of 
being reduced to written or graphic form regardless of the method of production or storage, 
including handwritten, typewritten, audio recordings, visual recordings, computers or other 
information storage or disseminating devices, as well as other tangible things or objects. 
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3. OBJECTIONS AND RIGHTS RESERVED. 
(a) This Order shall not prevent any party from: 
(i) Objecting to the production of any "Document" on grounds other than its 
confidential nature; 
(ii) Objecting at or before the pretrial conference to the offer or introduction 
of any "Document" into evidence on any grounds other than its 
confidential nature; and/or 
(iii) Contesting the designation by any other party of any "Document" as 
CONFIDENTIAL as provided in paragraph (b) of part (1), above. 
(b) Either party may seek an order from the Court providing for additional protection 
or disclosure with respect to confidential information. 
(c) A party's production of discovery material in this action shall not be deemed a 
waiver of the party's right to object to production of the discovery material in any other action. 
(d) Either party may request a modification of this Protective Order upon a showing 
of good cause. 
4. DOCUMENTS FILED OR LODGED WITH THE COURT. 
All "Documents" hereafter filed or lodged with the Court in this case (including those 
portions of the trial transcript and decision issued by the Court) that are designated and marked 
CONFIDENTIAL shall be treated as CONFIDENTIAL by the Clerk of the Court unless 
otherwise ordered by the Court. Information in a transcript or decision not previously designated 
as CONFIDENTIAL, may be sealed, if a party requests it, and no objections are made. The 
Court may rule that such information shall not be deemed CONFIDENTIAL, if an objection is 
made. Such "Documents" shall be filed in an envelope endorsed with the caption of this case, the 
title or a description of the type of pleading being filed, and a statement substantially in the 
following form: 
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This envelope contains documents designated as CONFIDENTIAL 
and is not to be opened nor the contents thereof disclosed except 
by the Court. Filed [lodged] the _ day of 20_, by 
____ , Attorney for ____________ _ 
After the litigation is concluded by settlement or tinal judgment, CONFIDENTIAL documents in 
the files of the Court shall be disposed of as the Court shall order. 
S. DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS. 
All "Documents" designated or protected as CONFIDENTIAL shall be shown and/or 
made available only to the following persons: 
(a) Parties to this litigation and their counsel, including counsel from the Idaho Office 
of Attorney General, in-house, and retained counsel to this litigation, and supervisors of such 
counsel for the parties, and employees of the parties and of such counsel, who are actively 
engaged in the preparation of and trial of this litigation, or in monitoring such activities or 
reviewing and deciding upon settlement potential and offers; 
(b) To the extent deemed necessary by counsel, independent experts or consultants 
furnishing assistance to counsel in connection with this litigation, provided that such individuals 
have agreed to be bound by this Order and have executed an undertaking in the fonn attached as 
Exhibit A; 
(c) The District Court, any appellate Courts, and Court staff to the extent necessary to 
decide the case. The Court(s) shall designate what portiones), if any, of its (their) orders and 
opinions are to be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. If no such designation is made with respect to 
an order or opinion, such order or opinion shall be public record. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this »day of-,",-_--,-_-.--




I hereby acknowledged that I have read the Protective Order ("Order") entered by the 
Court in the following action: 
PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 
Case No. CV OC 08 18158, Fourth Judicial District Court, Idaho 
I agree to be bound by the terms of said Order, to be subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court solely for purposes of any disputes arising with respect to the terms of the Order or 
performance thereunder, and, pursuant to the terms of the Order, agree to maintain in strict 
confidence all Documents designated or protected as CONFIDENTIAL as defined therein, any 
copies of such Documents that I make, and any correspondence, notes or reports I may prepare 
that is or are protected as CONFIDENTIAL. I understand that this material is to remain in my 
personal custody and shall not be disclosed to any persons other than those bound by the terms of 
this Order until I have completed my assigned duties, whereupon such Documents, copies, 
correspondence, notes and reports are to be returned to counsel who provided the 
CONFIDENTIAL Documents to me. I further agree to notify any personnel assisting me of the 
terms of said Order and to obtain an agreement from such personnel to be bound by it to the 




CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ day of ,2009, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION AND 
USE OF CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to each of the following: 
DAVID J CRAPO 
RICHARD ARMSTRONG 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ERICK M. SHANER 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION 
POBOX36 
BOISE ID 83722-0410 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
__ Telecopy 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Deputy 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADXAV1D NAVARRO, 















STATE OF IDAHO, 
RESPONDENT. 
CASE NO CV 0818158 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
CONCERNING MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE 
This is an action seeking judicial review of a decision by the Idaho Tax 
Commission concerning an assessment of operating property for tax purposes. 
Pending before the court are two motions in limine, both filed on behalf of Petitioner 
Pacificorp. The first motion in limine concerns interpretation of 1. C. § 63-409(2) as 
amended. The second motion seeks to prohibit or limit the introduction at trial of a 
report and testimony by an expert for Respondent State of Idaho. 
PETITIONER'S FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE 
I.C. § 63-409(2) was amended in 2003 to provide: 
In any appeal taken pursuant to this section, the burden of proof shall fall 
upon the party seeking affirmative relief to establish that the valuation 
from which the appeal is taken is erroneous, or that the state tax 
commission erred in its decision regarding a claim that certain property is 
exempt from taxation, the value thereof, or any other relief sought before 
the state tax commission. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to 
sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party 
seeking affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the 
evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. The district court shall 
render its decision in writing, including therein a concise statement of the 
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facts found by the court and the conclusions of law reached by the court. 
The court may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the state 
tax commission, and shall grant other relief, invoke such other remedies 
and issue such orders, in accordance with its decision, as appropriate. 
The legislative statement of purpose in amending I.C. § 63-409(2) provides 
that the statute: 
[i]dentifies the standard to be applied and the burden of proof in 
appeals of property tax assessments to the County Board of Equalization, the 
Board of Tax Appeals or the district court. This legislation changes the legal 
standard from one that requires proof that an assessment is manifestly 
excessive, arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive, to one that 
requires simply that the assessment is erroneous. It changes the burden of 
proof to satisfy that standard from a 'clear and convincing burden' to the 
normal 'preponderance of the evidence' standard applicable to most civil 
cases. 
The first motion is not a traditional motion in limine in that it is not a pre-
trial request that inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial. 
Black's Law Dictionary, at 1038-1039 (8th ed. 2004). Instead it asks for a pre-trial 
interpretation of the amended statute. Pacificorp seeks answers to three specific 
questions. 
**** 
Question No. 1. Whether Idaho Code § 63-409 changed prior law governing a 
party's burden of proof in an appeal of the tax commission's valuation to the district 
court? 
Idaho case law long has held that the burden of proof in tax appeals is on the 
petitioner to establish its claim by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Appeal 
of Sears, Roebuck & Co., 74 Idaho 39, 46-47, 256 P.2d 526 (1953); and numerous 
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subsequent cases. The amended statute, in contrast, provides that the burden of 
proof is by a "preponderance of the evidence." 
The purpose of statutory construction is to derive the intent of the 
legislature. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). When a statute is 
clear, the court shall follow the law as written; thus, when the language is 
unambiguous there is no reason to apply rules of construction. Sweeney v. Otter, 119 
Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990); Barbee v. W..MA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 
P.3d 657 (2006). 
In this case the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and the 
legislative intent is equally clear and unambiguous. The statute says what it means 
and means what it says. The answer to Question No.1 is: 
Idaho Code § 63-409 changed prior law governing a party's burden of proof in 
an appeal of the tax commission's valuation to the district court. 
The State, nevertheless, contends that application of the statute as written 
presents constitutional issues. That argument will be discussed in answering 
Question No.3. 
**** 
Question No.2. Whether Pacificorp's burden of persuasion at trial is to prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the tax commission's valuation for the year 
2008 is erroneous? 
Historically, the court was not required to: 
attempt to correct mere mistakes or errors of judgment on the part of an 
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assessor. On the other hand, the court will grant relief where the valuation 
fixed by the assessor is manifestly excessive, fraudulent, or oppressive; or 
arbitrary, capricious and erroneous resulting in discrimination against the 
tax payer. 
Appeal of Sears, Roebuck & Co., 74 Idaho at 46 (citations omitted). 
The amended statute now requires only that the petitioner show that the 
valuation was "erroneous." The legislative statement of purpose says that: 
This legislation changes the legal standard from one that requires proof that 
an assessment is manifestly excessive, arbitrary and capricious, or 
fraudulent and oppressive, to one that requires simply that the assessment is 
erroneous. 
Once again the language of the amended statute and the intent of the 
legislature is clear and ambiguous, leading to only one answer to Question No.2: 
Pacificorp's burden of persuasion at trial is to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the tax commission's valuation for the year 2008 is erroneous. 
As before The State contends that literal application of the statute presents 
constitutional issues. Its argument will be taken up in answering Question No.3. 
**** 
Question No.3 Whether Idaho Code § 63-409 violates the separation of 
powers provision of the Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section I? 
Idaho Constitution Article 2, Section 1, provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers belonging to either of 
the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or prohibited. 
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The State insists that it is not attacking the constitutionality of the statute 
but only seeking to place a gloss on the statutory language that will render it 
immune from an assertion that it violates the constitutional separation of powers. 
This contention is contradicted the strained statutory interpretations The State 
asks the court to make. Either the amended law is constitutional or it is not. The 
court will not indulge in re-legislating the statute to achieve a result not intended 
by the legislature. 
Question No.3 involves the constitutionality of two distinct parts of the 
amended statute: the change in the burden of proof and the change in the extent of 
appellate review. 
A. Does the change in the burden of proof offend the separation of powers 
doctrine? 
There is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutional: 
The party asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute bears the burden of 
showing its invalidity and must overcome a strong presumption of validity. It 
is generally presumed that legislative acts are constitutional, that the state 
legislature has acted within its constitutional powers, and any doubt 
concerning interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which 
will render the statute constitutional. 
Olsen v. J. A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285)(citations 
omitted). 
The question then is whether the Idaho Legislature exceeded its 
constitutional authority and infringed on the judicial authority in providing that 
the preponderance of evidence standard applies in cases such as this one. 
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A specific reference to the clear and convincing evidentiary standard appears 
in Appeal of Sears, Roebuck & Co. As noted above, Sears provided that "the burden 
of proof is upon the taxpayer to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is 
entitled to the relief claimed." 74 Idaho at 46-47. Two cases are cited in Sears for 
this proposition: Washington County v. First National Bank of Weiser, 35 Idaho 438, 
206 P. 1054 (1922); Phillips v. Bd. of Commissioners of Douglas County, 83 Colo. 82, 
262 P. 523 (1927). 
The Washington County case does not appear to mention a "clear and 
convincing" evidentiary standard, although it does note that there must not be a 
mere error in judgment but fraud or intentional and systematic discrimination. The 
Phillips case from Colorado does mention the clear and convincing standard in the 
context of stating that "[t]he taxpayer who asks relief against an alleged 
overassessment may have it only by affirmatively and clearly showing that it is 
manifestly excessive, fraudulent, or oppressive." 262 P. at 525. 
Nothing persuasive has been presented to the court demonstrating that the 
burden of proof standard is based upon an Idaho constitutional dictate. Nothing 
persuasive has been presented to show that the legislature lacks the power to 
specify the burden of proof to be met in this type of civil action. 
To rule otherwise would be contrary to the view that the legislature generally 
possesses plenary power in areas of substantive law. The case of In re SRBA Case 
No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,255, 912 P.2d 614,623 (1995), held that: 
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The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive laws in 
the Legislature. Idaho Const. art III, Section 1; see also Mead V. Arnell, 117 
Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990) ("[O]f Idaho's three branches of 
government, only the legislature has the power to make 'law." This power is 
not restricted by the Court's authority to enact rules of procedure to be 
followed in the district courts. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863,828 P.2d 
891,892 (1992).("This court's rule making power goes to procedural as 
opposed to substantive rules.") ... substantive law "creates, defines, and 
regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the 
essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law 
rights, and remedies are effectuated." 
**** 
("In the absence of a legislative invasion of constitu tionally protected 
rights, the judicial branch of the government must respect and defer to the 
legislature's exclusive policy decisions."). 
Likewise, " ... the legislature has plenary powering all matters except 
those prohibited by the Constitution." The legislature has the power to change the 
common law so long as the statutory change in the common law does not violate a 
constitutional provision. State v. Idaho Power Company, 81 Idaho 487,503-504,346 
P.2d 596 (1959); See, Utah Oil refining Co. v. Hendrix, 72 Idaho 407, 413, 242 P.2d 
124 (1952). 
Burden of proof determinations generally are held to be substantive rather 
than procedural. See, e.g., Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 
(2000) (issue of who has the burden of proof is substantive). In Valerie M. v. 
Arizona Department of Economic Security, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the 
legislature is empowered to set burdens of proof as a matter of substantive law and 
that a statute specifying a burden of proof prevails over common law or court rules 
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adopting a different standard. Valerie M. v. Arizona Department of Economic 
Security, 219 Ariz. 331, 198 P.3d 1203, 1208 (2009). 
The Idaho Legislature clearly intended to alter the burden of proof in tax 
appeals. This is a substantive issue and not merely a procedural issue. The 
legislature patently has the power to legislate in this substantive area and has not 
infringed on the constitutional prerogatives of another department of government. 
Consequently, there is no merit in The State's assertion that the burden of proof 
constitutionally must remain a clear and convincing standard in tax assessment 
valuation case. 
R Does the change in the scope of appellate review to "erroneous" offend the 
separation of powers doctrine? 
It long has been held that the levy of taxes is a legislative function. See, e.g., 
Humbird Lumber Co., 11 Idaho 614, 629, 83 P. 941 (1905); "'The power to tax, or 
exempt from taxation, remains with the Legislature.'" [SEOO v. State, 140 Idaho 
586,597, 97 P.3d 453 (2004), quoting Williams v. Baldridge, 48 Idaho 618, 630, 284 
P. 203 (1930). Likewise, the power to grant or withhold the right to appeal is a 
legislative, statutory power, unless the right to appeal is expressly granted 
constitutionally. Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 13; Daw v. School District 91 
Board of Trustees, 136 Idaho 806,41 P.3d 234 (2001); Streibeck v. Employment 
Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961); Porter v. Estate of Porter, 54 
Idaho 99,28 P.2d 898 (1934). In Streibeck, the court held that not only are the 
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statutory requirements as to the method and manner of taking an appeal 
mandatory, but also that: 
It is well established that except where the right of appeal is secured 
by the constitution, so as to have become a constitutional right, it is 
dependent entirely upon statute, and is subject to the control of the 
legislature, which may, in its discretion, grant or take away the remedy and 
prescribe in what case, under what circumstances, and to and from what 
court appeals may be taken. 
Streibeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho at 537. 
The concept that the legislature has plenary power in determining the 
manner and scope of tax appeals was upheld in Union Pacific Railroad Company 
v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982). In that case the 
Supreme Court held that the State Tax Commission's duty to conduct statewide 
assessments of operating property was statutory rather than constitutional and 
that the legislature was free to amend or repeal enactments relating to appeals 
from those assessments. 
Based on the foregoing analysis the change in the review standard to 
"erroneous" does not violate the separation of powers provision of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
**** 
The State has raised additional issues that should be discussed Firstly, 
The State argues that the amended statute eviscerates the long-established 




At common law the valuation of property for tax purposes was 
presumed correct. The Senator, Inc. v. Ada County, Bd. of Equalization, 138 
Idaho 566, 67 P.3d 45 (2003). Under IRE Rule 301(a): 
In all civil proceedings, unless provided by statute, .. , a 
presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the 
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, 
but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk 
of non persuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on 
whom it was originally cast. The burden of going forward is satisfied by 
the introduction of evidence sufficient to permit reasonable minds to 
conclude that the presumed fact does not exist. If the party against whom 
a presumption operates fails to meet the burden of going forward, the 
presumed fact shall be deemed proved. If the party meets the burden of 
going forward, .. , the trier of fact shall determine the existence or 
nonexistence of the presumed fact without regard to the presumption. 
(emphasis supplied). 
It is within the legislature's power to create evidentiary presumptions. In 
re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 255. A presumption merely relieves the 
party in favor of whom it operates from presenting additional evidence of the 
presumed fact until the opponent introduces sufficient evidence of its 
nonexistence. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,575,759 P.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Once the presumption is rebutted, it disappears and the facts on which it is 
based are weighed with all the other relevant facts. This is the "bursting bubble" 
theory of presumptions. State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 
736, 745, 947 P.2d 409 (1997). 
Although The State is fearful that the common law presumption of 
correctness has been overruled by amended § 63-409, a review of the statute 
reveals no language discarding the presumption. Likewise, the statement of 
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presumption exists at trial until and unless it is rebutted. 
Secondly, The State argues that the amended statute impermissibly shifts 
the burden of persuasion from the taxpayer to The State. 
The statute provides that "[a] preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to 
sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking 
affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in 
other civil litigation." I.e. § 63-409(2). 
In other words, the burden of proof is on the proponent to establish its claim 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden of going forward with evidence 
may shift from the proponent to the opposing party once the proponent makes out 
a prima facie case. Nevertheless, the proponent, in this case Pacificorp, will 
continue to have the ultimate burden of proof and the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. See, e.g., Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 
558,468 P.2d 290 (1970) (discussing rules of going forward with evidence in relation 
to the presumption of validity of ordinances). 
There is nothing in the amended statute that remotely suggests that The 
State has the ultimate burden of proof or the ultimate burden of persuasion. 
Thirdly, The State argues that a literal reading of the statute creates 
practical problems in reaching an appellate decision. A similar argument was made 
in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Board of Tax Appeals, when the legislature 
established a new method of tax appeal. The court commented that considerations 
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of practicality are more appropriately addressed to the legislature and that the 
COUl't should not substitute its judgment for what is good or bad management. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho at 815. 
**** 
In conclusion, the answer to Question No.3 is: 
Idaho Code § 63-409, as amended, does not violate the separation of powers 
provision of the Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section l. 
PETITIONER'S SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE 
Pacificorp's second motion in limine requests a ruling that parts of a report 
prepared by The State's expert witness, D. Brent Eyre, and parts of his testimony 
will not be allowed in evidence at the trial. The State contends that upon a proper 
foundation, the entire report and testimony relating to it will be admissible. See, 
Canyon County Board of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 
Idaho 58,137 P.2d 445 (2006). 
The trial probably will be conducted by Judge Greenwood, after he returns 
from medical leave. Because the motion concerns a ruling regarding whether or not 
specific items of evidence may be introduced at trial, it would be better for the 
judge presiding over the trial to make the ruling. The motion will be held in 
abeyance without prejudice to the petitioner's ability to reassert it at trial before 
Judge Greenwood. The court makes this decision notwithstanding Paragraph 8 of 
the pretrial order, which specifies that motions in limine shall be heard at least 21 
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days prior to the trial. It is a wiser practice in this instance to let the trial judge 
make the ruling, especially since he and not a jury will be the trier of fact. 
ORDER 
It hereby is ordered that the questions in the first motion in limine are 
answered as follows: 
1. Idaho Code § 63-409 changed prior law governing a party's burden of proof 
in an appeal of the tax commission's valuation to the district court. 
2. Pacificorp's burden of persuasion at trial is to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the tax commission's valuation for the year 2008 is erroneous. 
3. Idaho Code § 63-409, as amended, does not violate the separation of powers 
provision of the Idaho Constitution, Article II, Section 1. 
It further is ordered that a ruling on the second motion in limine will be held 
in abeyance until trial. 
This order is interlocutory in nature and is subject to revision by Judge 
Greenwood as he may deem appropriate. 
Dated this 28th Day of June 2010 
& J\-{L,/.....-..--<..-
George D. Carey, Senior District Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO CV 0818158 
MEMORANDUM OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
RESPONDENT. 
This is an action seeking judicial review or appeal of a decision by the Idaho 
Tax Commission concerning assessed valuation of operating property of PacifiCorp 
for property tax purposes. The matter was presented to the court in a trial de novo 
starting on July 12, 20010, and concluding on July 19, 2010. PacifiCorp was 
represented by David J. Crapo and Richard J. Armstrong. The State was 
represented by Lawrence G. Allen and Erick M. Shaner. The parties submitted 
post-trial memoranda on August 9,2010. The court, being fully advised, enters the 
following memorandum of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In this case, the attorneys have been such a pleasure to work with that I probably would 
not have been disappointed if the case had continued for several more days. Thank you all for the 
professional, competent, and courteous manner in which you conducted the trial. 
2. This memorandum constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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3. In general the scope of judicial review of agency action is as provided by 
statute. IRCP Rule 84(e)(2). 
4. The parties have disagreed about the burden of proof and the standard of 
review in de novo tax appeals. 
5. I.C. § 63-409(2), which is applicable to this case, was amended in 2003 to 
provide a new standard of review and a new burden of proof in reviewing the 
assessment of operating property for tax purposes: 
In any appeal taken pursuant to this section, the burden of proof shall fall 
upon the party seeking affirmative relief to establish that the valuation 
from which the appeal is taken is erroneous, or that the state tax 
commission erred in its decision regarding a claim that certain property is 
exempt from taxation, the value thereof, or any other relief sought before 
the state tax commission. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to 
sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party 
seeking affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the 
evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. The district court shall 
render its decision in writing, including therein a concise statement of the 
facts found by the court and the conclusions of law reached by the court. 
The court may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand any order of the state 
tax commission, and shall grant other relief, invoke such other remedies 
and issue such orders, in accordance with its decision, as appropriate. 
6. The legislative statement of purpose in amending I.C. § 63-409(2) provided 
that the statute: 
[i]dentifies the standard to be applied and the burden of proof in 
appeals of property tax assessments to the County Board of Equalization, the 
Board of Tax Appeals or the district court. This legislation changes the legal 
standard from one that requires proof that an assessment is manifestly 
excessive, arbitrary and capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive, to one that 
requires simply that the assessment is erroneous. It changes the burden of 
proof to satisfy that standard from a 'clear and convincing burden' to the 
normal 'preponderance of the evidence' standard applicable to most civil 
cases. 
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7. Based on the 2003 amendments to I.e. § 63-409(2) and based on the court's 
memorandum and order entered on June 28, 2010, the court will not apply the old 
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence and will not require a showing 
that the decision of the Tax Commission was manifestly excessive, arbitrary and 
capricious, or fraudulent and oppressive. Instead, the court will apply the 
preponderance of evidence burden of proof and will require only that PacifiCorp 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision of the tax commission 
was erroneous. 
8. An appeal from an assessment of valuation of operating property is to be 
heard as a trial de novo without a jury and "in the same manner as though it were 
an original proceeding .... " I.C. § 63-409(1). Trial de novo means "a trying of the 
matter anew-the same as if it had never been heard before." Gilbert v. Moore, 108 
Idaho 165, 168,697 P.2d 1179 (1985); Canyon County Board of Equalization v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Company, LLC, 143 Idaho 58, 61,137 P.3d 445 (2006). Thus, 
while the decision of the Idaho Tax Commission forms the basis of the appeal, the 
record of the commission hearing is not examined for error in the traditional sense; 
in fact the record is not before the de novo court. Rather, the court hears the case as 
a new hearing or as a hearing for a second time. In many respects it hears the case 
as a court of original rather than appellate jurisdiction. Compare, Beker Industries, 
Inc. v. Georgetown Irrigation District, 101 Idaho 187, 190, 610 P.2d 546 (1980). The 
de novo trial court's decision, nevertheless, must include an implicit determination 
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of whether the decision of the Idaho State Tax Commission was or was not 
erroneous. I.C. § 63-409(2). 
9. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated the purpose and nature of findings of 
fact and conclusions of law required by IRCP Rule 52(a) in the following language: 
In considering the detail which the findings and conclusions 
should contain, it is helpful to review decisions of Federal Courts 
relative to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 
U.s.C.A. which is almost identical to Rule 52(a) LR.C.P. In the 
Committee Note of 1946 to Subdivision (a) it is stated that "These 
findings should represent the judge's own determination and not the 
long, often argumentative statements of successful counsel; *** the 
judge need only make brief, definite, pertinent findings and 
conclusions upon contested matters; there is no necessity for over-
elaboration of detail or particularization of facts." Findings should not 
be discursive; they should not state the evidence or any of the 
reasoning upon the evidence. 
"A scientific distinction between fact and law is not 
workable. Nor would such a distinction serve the purpose 
behind Rule 52, which is to aid the trial court in making a 
correct appraisal of the evidence and the law to the end 
that a sound decision is made, to show what has been 
adjudicated for future purposes for res judicata and 
estoppel by judgment, and to aid the appellate court 
where an appeal is taken." 
Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 191, 370 P.2d 788 (1962). Other courts have 
held that a trial court shall make findings only on those essential facts that lay a 
basis for its decision. White Industries, Inc., v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 845 F.2d 1497 
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. den. 488 U.s. 856; In re Imperial Irr. Dist., 38 F.Supp. 770 
(S.D. Cal. 1941). "What Rule 52(a) does not require is a particularized finding on 
each piece of evidence presented by the parties." White Industries, Inc., v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., at 1499. 
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10. The findings offact will not include matters that have not been 
established by the weight of the credible evidence. In keeping with the spirit of Rule 
52(a), the court's findings will not restate every item of documentary evidence or 
every item of testimony or every expert opinion. The findings will not contain a 
recitation of conflicts in the evidence or the court's reasoning in resolving each of 
the conflicts. The findings will consist only of a recitation of those material facts and 
expert opinions that have been established by credible and competent evidence to be 
more probably true than not true and that bear on the issues that legally may be 
addressed. 
11. This case in many respects was a battle of the experts. The expert 
opinions derived from the evidence were contradictory. This is not surprising, 
considering that there is very little science but a great deal of art in valuing 
property. Differences of opinion do not mean that any of the witnesses was being 
deliberately untruthful. Contradictory versions of facts and opinions in the 
presentation of testimony often result from differing recollections of events, from 
failures to communicate accurately what one means to say, and especially from 
honest differences of expert opinion. With that in mind the following is what the 
court believes to be the facts, as established by a preponderance of the evidence and 
the applicable law. 
12. Each side has presented the court with proposed findings of fact and 
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conclusions of law. After hearing all the evidence and considering the applicable 
law, the court is satisfied that PacifiCorp has established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the estimated Idaho valuation placed on PacifiCorp's operating 
property by the Tax Commission, from which this appeal was taken, in fact was 
erroneous. The preponderance of the evidence also establishes that the estimated 
Idaho valuation proposed by PacifiCorp is correct. It will be evident that many of 
the court's findings and conclUSIons contained in this memorandum come from the 
proposed findings and conclusions submitted by PacifiCorp. This is because the 
court has a firm belief from its independent review of the evidence and the law that 
the findings and conclusions of law submitted by PacifiCorp, for the most part, are 
accurate, are correct, and, most importantly from the legal point of view, are 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. To the extent that they appear 
correct they now constitute the court's own findings and conclusions after due 
consideration of the contentions of the parties. 
13. PacifiCorp is a vertically integrated, regulated electric utility, wholly 
owned since March 2006 by a subsidiary of MidAmerican Energy Holdings 
Company. MERC in turn is a consolidated subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 
The stock of PacifiCorp is not publically traded. 
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14. Pursuant to Idaho law, the real and personal property PacifiCorp uses in 
its electric utility operations is designated as "operating property." Idaho Code § 
63-201(16). PacifiCorp also has non-operating property. 
15. The operating property located in Idaho is subject to assessment by the 
Tax Commission, and the Commission is required to determine the market value of 
the operating property annually as of January 1st of each year. I.C. §§ 63-204,205, 
207,405. Non-operating property is not valued by the Tax Commission. 
16. ''''Market value" means the amount of United States dollars or the 
equivalent for which, in all probability, a property would exchange hands between a 
willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer, with a 
reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a reasonable 
down or full cash payment." I.C. § 63-201(15). 
17. The unit method of valuation is preferred for valuing a public utility such 
as PacifiCorp. The three traditional approaches to property value -- the cost 
approach, the income approach, and the market approach -- may be used. For 
interstate property, allocation factors must be used to determine the part of the unit 
or system value attributable to Idaho. 
18. The appraisal procedures to be used are those procedures, methods, and 
techniques accepted by nationally recognized appraisal and valuation 
organizations. In using the cost approach, obsolescence, if any should be measured 
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and considered. Property Tax Administrative Rules for Assessment of Operating 
Property, § 63-405. In summary, the unitary method of valuation consists of several 
steps: determining the unit to be appraised; estimating the value of the unit or 
system; allocating the correct portion of the unit value to the particular taxing 
entity, in this case, Idaho; and applying the appropriate adjustments and 
exemptions. 
19. The tax involved in this matter is the ad valorem property tax on the 
electric operating property owned by PacifiCorp in the state of Idaho as of the 
valuation date of January 1, 2008. 
20. PacifiCorp is a regulated electricity company serving customers in parts 
of the states of California, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
21. PacifiCorp is subject to comprehensive regulation by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission and other federal, state, and local regulatory agencies. 
These authorities regulate various matters, including customer rates, service 
territories, allocation of costs by state, asset acquisitions and sales, wholesale sales 
and purchases of electricity, operation of electric generation and transmission 
facilities, issuances of securities, and accounting policies and practices. 
22. PacifiCorp's rates for electricity are regulated by the state public service 
or public utilities commissions in the states of California, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, 
Washington, and Wyoming. These states individually set PacifiCorp's rates for 
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electricity by determining a revenue requirement for the company that should 
provide it with the opportunity to recover its operating costs and earn a reasonable 
market return on its invested capital - the rate base. The revenue requirement 
equals expenses plus the product of the rate base times the rate of return 
(Revenue Requirement = Expenses + (Rate Base x Rate of Return)). 
23. Once PacifiCorp's revenue requirement has been determined by a state 
public utilities commission, PacifiCorp usually is not allowed to adjust the rates it 
charges until a new rate case is filed with the particular commission, and the 
commission issues an order modifying the revenue requirement. 
24. PacifiCorp has made significant investments in its property, plant, and 
equipment in the years preceding January 1, 2008. It is not allowed, however, to 
automatically include the new property in its rate base until it has filed a rate case 
and received an order from the appropriate commission authorizing inclusion of the 
new properties. Likewise if operating costs increase PacifiCorp usually cannot 
recover the increased expenses until it has fIled a rate case and received 
authorization from the appropriate commission. 
25. PacifiCorp has filed rate cases during the past several years to include 
newly acquired property and increased expenses in its rates. However, it ordinarily 
takes six to eighteen months after filing for a utilities commission to process and 
rule on a rate filing. As a result of this regulatory lag, PacifiCorp's earnings are 
negatively affected until and if a favorable rate increase is allowed. 
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26. Rate regulation also affects PacifiCorp's earnings, because the 
investments allowed to be included in the rate base vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. 
27. One result of rate regulation is that PacifiCorp's actual average net rate 
of return on its plant in service has been 7.2% over the five years immediately 
preceding January 1, 2008, while the "investor-market required rate of return", or 
allowed rate of return, for the regulated electric utility industry has been 9.1%. 
Thus the actual rate of return for PacifiCorp as of January 1, 2008, was 
approximately 20.88% less than the market rate of return (100% - (7.2% / 9.1%) = 
20.879%). 
28. PacifiCorp keeps regulatory books in accordance with FERC accounting 
guidelines. In accordance with the guidelines, PacifiCorp must calculate its 
depreciation based on a straight line book depreciation model. Book depreciation 
results in ratable allocation of asset costs over the accounting periods during which 
the assets provide useful service. Straight line book depreciation, however, is an 
accounting tool that has little use in estimating the true value of assets. 
29. In appraising property, three types of depreciation generally are 
recognized - physical, functional, and external. Physical depreciation refers to 
diminution in value due to physical deterioration, decay, and wear and tear. 
Functional depreciation or functional obsolescence refers to diminution in value due 
to flaws in structure, materials, and design, or due to subsequent improvements in 
design and operation. External depreciation or economic obsolescence refers to 
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diminution in value due to negative influences outside the property, such as 
regulation, regulatory lag, political considerations, and changes in demand. 
30. Book depreciation is not calculated for the purpose of estimating the true 
difference between original cost and current market value. It does not account for 
all forms of functional and external obsolescence that may affect an electric utility's 
assets. 
31. On June 16, 2008, the Property Tax Bureau of the Tax Commission 
issued its 2008 appraisal report, prepared by Jerott Rudd, for PacifiCorp. The report 
found that the indicators of value of the operating property to be 
$11,122,536,280.00, using a type of cost approach known as historic cost less 
depreciation (HCLD), and $7,761,521,809.00, using a type of income approach 
known as yield capitalization of net operating income (NO I). Mr. Rudd did not use 
any type of market approach. He applied 45% weight to the HCLD approach and 
55% weight to the NOI approach, resulting in a unit or system value of 
$9,273,982,721.00. He reduced this amount by $240,761,350.00 for the value of non-
taxable intangible property. He multiplied the result by the Idaho allocation factor 
of 3.745822% to obtain an Idaho allocated value of $338,368,433.00. Additional 
adjustments for various deductions and exemptions of $74,701,191.00 resulted in a 
final estimated Idaho valuation of $263,667,243.00. 
32. PacifiCorp protested and received a hearing before the Tax Commission. 
PacifiCorp argued that the assessment was erroneous, because it failed to account 
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fully for obsolescence in determining depreciation for the HCLD cost approach and 
because it underestimated the cost of equity in the income approach. 
33. Following a hearing the Tax Commission entered its decision. The 
Commission allowed a functional and economic (or external) obsolescence 
adjustment of 7.93% to the HCLD, resulting in an HCLD indicator of value of 
$10,241,519,153.00. There is no evidence suggesting the methodology used in 
arriving at a 7.93% adjustment. 
34. The Commission made no adjustment to the NOI indicator of value and 
did not use a market approach indicator of value. It applied the same weight as Mr. 
Rudd to the indicators of value, resulting in a system value of $8,877,075,014.00. 
This amount was reduced by $230,457,249.00 for the value of non-taxable 
intangible property. The result was multiplied by the Idaho allocation factor of 
3.745822% to obtain an Idaho allocated value of $323,886,948.00. Additional 
adjustments for various deductions and exemptions of $71,504,129.00 resulted in a 
final estimated Idaho valuation of $252,382,129.00. 
35. PacifiCorp timely filed a petition for judicial review of the decision of the 
Tax Commission. 
36. At trial, PacifiCorp relied primarily on the expert testimony of Thomas K. 
Tegarden of Tegarden & Associates, Inc. Mr. Tegarden is a respected expert in 
valuation methodology with 40 years of experience in valuing electric utility 
operating properties. The Tax Commission relied on the expert appraisal testimony 
of Jerott Rudd, senior utility appraiser for the Tax Commission, and D. Brent Eyre, 
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a retired appraiser and auditor for the Utah State Tax Commission, who ordinarily 
testifies on behalf of taxing authorities. The Tax Commission also utilized Dr. Ben 
Johnson, a consulting economist and president of Ben Johnson Associates, Inc. 
37. Each of the witnesses has considerable experience in his particular field. 
Nevertheless, having had the special opportunity of listening to each witness as he 
gave live testimony and was subjected to rigorous cross examination, the court was 
especially impressed by Mr. Tegarden and found his testimony and opinions to be 
more credible, more reliable, more persuasive, and entitled to greater weight than 
the testimony and opinions of the witnesses for the Tax Commission. 
38. Mr. Tegarden researched, investigated, prepared, and testified to an 
analysis of the unit valuation of PacifiCorp's operating property. His testimony 
concerning his methodology and opinions is illustrated in Petitioner's Exhibit 20. 
He used the same valuation models employed by Mr. Rudd and the Tax 
Commission: the HCLD historical cost less depreciation approach and the yield 
capitalization income approach. As with Mr. Rudd but unlike Mr. Eyre, he did not 
use any type of market approach and felt that a market analysis, whether by way of 
comparable sales or by way of a stock and debt approach, was not useful as an 
indicator in attempting to value PacifiCorp's operating property. 
39. Turning to the HCLD cost approach to valuation, generally accepted 
appraisal principles state that an appraiser may use one or more of three methods 
of measuring external or economic obsolescence: (1) allocation of market-extracted 
depreciation; (2) analysis of market data; and (3) capitalization of income loss. Mr. 
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Tegarden used the capitalization of income loss method, the same method used by 
the Tax Commission in a 2006 valuation case involving PacifiCorp. 
40. In following this method, Mr. Teagarden stated that an HCLD cost 
indicator of value may be derived by using original cost figures and deducting 
physical, functional, and external depreciation. He used the figures supplied in the 
FERC report for the year ending December 31,2007, for historical cost less physical 
and functional depreciation. This resulted in a figure of $11,135,919,587. 
41. He then did an analysis of external obsolescence or depreciation using the 
capitalization of income loss method, some of which has been summarized in 
Paragraph 27, above. He defined external obsolescence or external depreciation as 
the loss in value due to causes outside the property, including the effect of supply 
and demand and governmental regulation. He testified that there can be many 
other causes of external obsolescence, such as changes in operating costs, changes in 
interest rates, changes in employment, the effect of zoning, the political climate, 
credit markets, and environmental concerns. The most important factor for a 
utility, however, historically has been government regulation. 
42. The theory behind this method of measuring external depreciation is that 
a willing, informed buyer of a regulated utility will expect a market rate of return of 
net operating income. If the net operating income of the utility is more than the 
market rate of return this will be reflected in external appreciation of the value of 
the operating property, but if the net operating income is less than the market rate 
of return this will be reflected in external depreciation of the value of the operating 
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property. In PacifiCorp's case the net operating income over the immediately 
preceding five-year period was approximately 7.2%, while the net operating income 
for PacifiCorp's peer group (that is, the expected or allowed market rate of return of 
net operating income) was 9.1%, resulting in the previously noted 20.88% negative 
difference between PacifiCorp's rate of return and the market rate of return. 
Treating this as a measure of external or economic obsolescence resulted in 
additional depreciation of $2,325, 180,010.00 and reduced the cost indicator of value 
to $8,810,739,577.00 ($11,135,919,587 - $2,325,180,010.00 = $8,810,739,577.00). 
Mr. Tegarden rounded his cost indicator of value to $8,811,000,000.00. 
43. Turning to the income approach to valuation, Mr. Tegarden used the yield 
capitalization income approach to obtaining an indicator of value , as did Mr. Rudd, 
albeit with a different result. In its simplest terms, the income approach involves a 
determination of value based upon cash flow divided by a capitalization rate-
growth. Mr. Rudd estimated cash flow to be around $690,000,000.00 and the 
capitalization rate to be 8.89% resulting in a valuation estimate of 
$7,761,529,809.00. Mr. Tegarden estimated cash flow to be around 
$750,000,000.00 and the capitalization rate to be around 9.10% resulting a in a 
valuation estimate of $8,242,000,000.00. 
44. Mr. Tegarden estimated a larger cash flow than Mr. Rudd, because he 
attempted to account for future earnings to be derived from rate changes allowed 
prior to the valuation date and future earnings to be anticipated as a result of 
construction in progl .. ess. Mr. Tegarden's capitalization rate was larger than Mr. 
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Rudd's primarily because Mr. Tegarden included in his estimate a flotation 
adjustment. Flotation costs are those costs associated with financing investment, 
that is, the expenses involved in issuing debt and equity. 
45. Neither Mr. Rudd nor Mr. Tegarden used any type of comparative sales 
approach in making an estimate of valuation. Implicit in their decision not to use 
the sales approach was the paucity of sales of operating utilities to use as a 
comparison. The stock and debt approach, a substitute for the comparable sales 
approach, was used by Mr. Eyre, to arrive at his estimate of value. Mr. Rudd did 
not use this approach because of the difficulty in arriving at accurate assumptions 
and estimations. Mr. Teagarden also questioned whether accurate assumptions and 
adjustments could be made. The criticisms appear justified, especially in view of the 
facts that PacifiCorp does not have publicly traded stock, and the price of its sale to 
a subsidiary of MEHC in 2006 included a significant amount of intangible goodwill. 
46. The court finds that neither a traditional comparable sales approach nor 
a similar stock and debt approach would have been useful in valuing the operating 
property of PacifiCorp. 
47. Returning to Mr. Tegarden's valuations, he placed relatively little 
reliance on the HCLD approach and significantly greater reliance on the income 
approach to valuation. While not specifically stated in his opinion, a mathematical 
calculation shows that Mr. Tegarden applied a 19% weight to the HCLD approach 
and a 81% weight to the income approach resulting in his opinion that the 
valuation of the operating property of PacifiCorp as of January 1, 2008, was 
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$8,350,000,000.00 (19% x $8,811,000,000.00[cost approach] + 81% x 
$8,242,000,000.00 [income approach] = $8,350,110,000.00). As noted, the allocation 
was based on his opinion that the income approach resulted in a far more accurate 
estimate of valuation than the HCLD approach. 
48. The court has reviewed the criticisms of Mr. Tegarden's valuations but 
finds them to be unpersuasive 
49. After evaluating all the evidence the court concludes that Mr. Tegarden's 
estimate of the value ofPacifiCorp's operating property as of January 1, 2008, is the 
most accurate estimate of value in the record. Implicit in this conclusion is the 
additional conclusion that the estimate of value of $8,877,075,014.00 in the Tax 
Commission's decision necessarily is erroneous. 
50. Mr. Tegarden applied the same Idaho allocation factor of 3.745822% 
used by the Tax commission and the same adjustments and exemptions used by the 
Tax Commission to arrive at a net estimated Idaho value for PacifiCorp's operating 
property of $230,680,003.00 as of January 1, 2008. Calculations of the adjustments, 
exemptions, and Idaho allocation factor do not appear to be in dispute. 
51. Based on the foregoing analysis, the court concludes that the order of the 
Tax Commission was erroneous and that the case should be remanded to the Tax 
Commission to re-set the value of PacifiCorp's Idaho operating property at 
$230,680,003.00 as of the January 1, 2008 assessment date. 
52. The court has no information on the amount of any tax refund owed to 
PacifiCorp because of the erroneous valuation. 
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53. As the prevailing party PacifiCorp is entitled to an award of costs to the 
extent allowed by statute or rule 
54. Counsel for PacifiCorp is requested to submit a proposed judgment in 
accordance with this memorandum opinion. 
Dated September 152010 
George D. Darey, Senior District J 
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) IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
) 
) Respondent 
COMES NOW the Idaho State Tax Commission, defendant, by and through its attorney 
of record, Lawrence G. Allen, Deputy Attorney General, and objects to Plaintiffs proposed 
Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l). This Motion is supported by a 
memorandum filed herewith. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2010. 
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MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - I ORl I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1st day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION IN 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
DA VID J CRAPO 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 2 
/ 
LA WRENCE G. WASDEN 
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LA WRENCE G. ALLEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STA TE OF IDAHO 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
TELEPHONE NO.: (208) 332-3090 
FACSIMILE: (208) 854-8073 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent 
) Case No.: CV OC 0818158 
) 
~ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 





Defendant Idaho State Tax Commission (Commission) objects to several aspects of 
Plaintiffs proposed Judgment. 
First, the proposed Judgment directs counties to refund property taxes plus interest to 
PacifiCorp. The counties, however, are not named parties in the case. The Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over the counties and any judgment entered against them is void. See, e.g. Meyers v. 
Hansen, 148 Idaho 283 (2009). Entry of the proposed Judgment would violate the counties' 
procedural due process as it would deprive them of the opportunity to be heard. See, e.g. Cowan 
v. Board of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho 501 at 510 (2006). Even it could apply to the counties, the 
proposed Judgment ignores Idaho Code § 63-1305. This section provides that counties have the 
option of refunding tax, giving credit on future tax years, or a combination of the two. 
000'71 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 1 ORIGINAL 
Second, the proposed Judgment orders the Commission to "re-set the January 1, 2008 
Estimated Idaho Valuation ofPacifiCorp's operating property." This is not contemplated under 
the statutes setting and certifying assessed values. The Commission, sitting as the State Board of 
Equalization, certifies county values in August. After it adjourns, it does not meet again until the 
following August. PacifiCorp's value is a part of these certified county values. The refund 
amounts due from each appropriate county can be calculated without upsetting the August 
certifications by amending the value from which PacifiCorp appealed. 
Third, the proposed Judgment also orders the Commission to pay PacifiCorp's costs, but 
this is inappropriate without first filing the cost memorandum and affidavit. A final judgment 
should recite a specific dollar amount for allowed costs. Lacking an exact amount, there is no 
final adjudication of the rights of the parties, hence no final judgment. See, e.g. Spokane 
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616 (2010). 
The proposed Judgment should require the Commission to calculate appropriate refund 
amount due from each affected county, and to communicate that amount to the county. The 
refund itself, together with any interest claimed, must be requested from the individual county. 
DATED this 1 st day of October, 2010. 
'vlEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 st day of October, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S MEMORANDID.1 IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT, by depositing the 
same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the fan owing: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
DA VID J CRAPO 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MEMORAl'\DUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 3 
From: FIRM 801 366 6061 1 o 16: 13 #963 P.002/007 
Richard 1. Armstrong, ISB No. 5548 
David 1. Crapo, pro hac vice 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
OCT 1 4 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
8y eARLY LATIMORE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 




IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent 
) 
) RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE 
) TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION IN 
) OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
) JUDGMENT 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0818158 
) 
) Judge George D. Carey 
) 
Petitioner, PacifiCorp, by and through its counsel of record, hereby responds to the Idaho 
State Tax Commission's ("Commission") Motion in Objection to Proposed Judgment. 
On October 1, 2010, the Commission filed its Motion objecting to the proposed form of 
order. The Commission raised three objections: 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 1 
= 
From: FIRM 801 388 8081 1 o 18: 13 
(l) the Court cannot direct the affected counties to issue a refund 
because they did not participate as parties in this action, 
#983 P.003/007 
(2) the Commission cannot "reset" the value because the State Board 
of Equalization is closed, and 
(3) PacifiCorp must file its cost memorandum before the Judgment 
can be entered. 
Upon receiving a copy of the Commission's Motion, counsel for PacifiCorp contacted 
council for the Commission to discuss whether revisions could be made to the proposed form of 
judgment that would resolve the above noted objections. Through a series of discussions, 
counsel for the parties have been able to resolve all but the first objection listed above. 
A revised proposed judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit I. This proposed judgment 
resolves objections 2 and 3. Counsel for PacifiCorp has been informed that the only language the 
Commission objects to at this time is paragraph four in the attached proposed judgment. 
By way of clarification, the parties resolved objection 2 above, by removing the "reset" 
language from the first proposed judgment and merely made the conclusion of value an order of 
the Court. The revised, and agreed to, language on this point is contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 
of the attached proposed judgment. 
In regard to objection 3, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedures clearly provides 
that the prevailing party does not have to file the cost memorandum prior to the entry of 
judgment. Such cost memorandum must be filed within fourteen days of the date of the 
judgment. The parties resolved objection 3 by merely clarifying that the provisions of Rule 54 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 2 
From: fIRM 801 3SS SOS1 1 o 1S: 14 D9S3 P.004/007 
would govern the cost procedure. The revised and agreed to language on this point is contained 
in paragraph 5. 
The only remaining dispute regarding the proposed judgment is paragraph 4. PacifiCorp 
believes that the proposed language in this paragraph is appropriate and necessary. Idaho Code 
Ann. § 63-409(1) provides that a taxpayer may appeal a Tax Commission decision on the 
assessment of operating property to the district court. This section further provides that the filing 
of the district court action does not "suspend the payment of the taxes" to the counties during the 
pendency of the case at the district court. However, pursuant to Idaho law, if the district court 
ultimately determines that the Commission's original assessment was in excess of the actual fair 
market value of the property, the Court can order that the counties refund any taxes they have 
collected on the erroneous assessment: 
"When any court or board of tax appeals orders a refund of any groperty taxes 
imposed under Chapters 1 throua=h 17 of this title 63 the county commissioners of the 
county or counties which collected the taxes may either refund the taxes or apply the 
amount to be refunded as a credit against taxes due from the taxpayer in the following 
year. The county commissioners may use a combination of both a payment and a credit 
to effect the refund. 
Idaho Code Ann. § 63-1305(1)(emphasis added). The property taxes at issue in this matter are 
imposed against PacifiCorp's operating property under chapter 4 of title 63. The Court has 
determined that the Tax Commission's Estimated Idaho Valuation in this case was in excess of 
the fair market value ofPacifiCorp's operating property. This Court clearly has authority to 
order that PacifiCorp be paid a refund on any property taxes that were collected on a valuation 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 3 
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amount in excess of $230,680,003. In entering this judgment, the Court has authority to order 
the Commission to reallocate the correct value and communicate the corrected reallocated 
amounts to the affected counties, and to remind the counties that upon receiving these corrected 
allocations, they are required by Idaho Code Ann. § 63-1305 to either pay a refund or credit with 
interest (or combination of a refund or credit) to PacifiCorp of any excess taxes that were 
collected on the erroneous original assessment of the Tax Commission. 
The cases cited by the Tax Commission in support of the concept that a non-party cannot 
be ordered to pay a refund (i.e. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 221 PJd 81 (2009) and Cowan 
v. Board ofComm 'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006)) are inapposite because they do not 
address the statutory situation presented in this case where Idaho law requires counties to refund 
excess property taxes they have collected on an original assessment that has been declared 
erroneous by a,court or state board of equalization. 
PacifiCorp is requesting that the Court make an express declaration that Idaho law 
requires the payment of interest on any refund or credit amounts. In prior years, when PacifiCorp 
has received refunds from the counties, some counties have disputed whether they are required to 
pay interest on the refunds. Consequently, some counties would remit interest and some would 
not. This resulted in a haphazard and disparate application of the law. This type of undirected 
action is unfair to the taxpayer and the different counties that properly remitted interest. 
Accordingly, PacifiCorp has merely identified Idaho Code § 63-1305 in which it clarifies that the 
Counties may either pay a refund, issue a credit or a combination of both. Moreover, Idaho Code 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 4 
000f77 
from:FIRN 801 388 8081 1 10 18: 15 #983 P.008/007 
§ 63-1305 expressly provides that interest shall be paid on these refund amounts. Inasmuch as 
this judgment is an order of the Court, this Court has authority to direct the payment of interest 
on any refunds that are to be paid in relation to the reduction of the value ofPacifiCorp's 
operating property. 
For the foregoing reasons, PacifiCorp respectfully requests that the revised judgment 
submitted herewith be issued by the Court 
/ 4¥-DATED this __ day of October, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11!!Jay of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S MOTION IN 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT was mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Lawrence G. Allen 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720·0010 
Erick M. Shaner 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0410 
RESPONSE TO THE IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
MOTION IN OBJECTION TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT - 6 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN, ISB #3586 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
ERICK SHANER, ISB #5214 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
LAWRENCE G. ALLEN, ISB #6137 
Deputy Attorney General 
Civil Litigation Division 
Second Floor 
954 W. Jefferson 
Boise, ID 83720 
Telephone: (208) 332-3090 
Fax: (208) 854-8073 
larry.allenlli{ag.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO: CV-OC-08-18158 
) 
) IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION'S 
) REPL Y BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 




PacitiCorp submitted a proposed judgment to this Court and the Tax Commission made a 
motion to object to the proposed judgment. Following the Tax Commission's objection, counsel 
for the parties consulted and reached agreement on the proposed judgment with the exception of 
the following paragraph: 
00080 
Reply Brief in Opposition to Proposed Judgment - 1 
nR\G\NAL 
PacifiCorp may then obtain a refund from each affected county for any 
property taxes it paid to such county that is in excess of its tax obligation for the 
respective allocable portion of the $230,680,003 allocated to such county. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-1305, the affected counties may pay PacifiCorp a 
refund of the taxes, credit the amount of the refund against taxes due in the 
following year, or use a combination of a payment and a credit. Regardless of 
the method used by the Counties to effectuate the payment, the refund or credit 
shall include interest at the statutory rate. 
PacifiCorp's proposed judgment at p. 2. 
The problem with this proposed language is that it violates fundamental notions of due 
process by imposing an order on the Counties when the Counties were not a party to these 
proceedings. Therefore at this juncture this Court does not have jurisdiction to direct the 
counties to issue refunds. 
This issue was not addressed by the parties at the trial. PacifiCorp did not present any 
evidence of payment of tax or of potential refunds or credits that might be due in the event this 
Court r~duced the appraised value ofPacifiCorp's operating property. 
For this Court to receive such evidence and rule upon the matter would have required 
PacifiCorp to name the more than twenty counties as parties in the case, thereby providing the 
counties with an opportunity to raise appropriate defenses, such as nonpayment of the tax, and be 
heard on the matter. PacifiCorp is correct in noting that a district court can order a specific 
amount of refund, including interest, pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-1305. However, that 
statutory section pertains to appeals of local assessments in which the county is a party to the 
suit. When the court has the taxing authority before it, the court can order that authority to 
refund the taxes it collected, with interest if appropriate. The County Commissioners then have 
the option of either refunding the taxes erroneously collected, providing the taxpayer with a 
credit for next year's assessment, or a combination of a refund and a credit. 
Reply Brief in Opposition to Proposed Judgment - 2 
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Conversely, the State Board of Equalization (Tax Commission) does not impose or 
collect property taxes. The Tax Commission establishes and equalizes values for operating 
properties. Idaho Code § 63-405. The Tax Commission then certifies the values to local taxing 
districts which set the levies and calculate the taxes due. Idaho Code § 63-410. The State Tax 
Commission does not calculate the taxes for the various taxing districts. As a practical matter, 
since the Tax Commission does not impose and administer the taxes in the first instance, the Tax 
Commission is not in a position, nor does it have subject-matter knowledge about the appropriate 
defenses or issues involved in issuing refunds or interest on the refunds. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the taxing authority is not before the court, the court cannot order a refund of 
taxes. Once the values are certified by the court, the matter is in the hands of the Boards of 
County Commissioners of the counties in which the company operates. If there is a dispute 
between the Counties and PacifiCorp regarding refunds that may result from the reduced 
valuation ordered by this Court, the parties will need to resolve that dispute independently. For 
these reasons, the judgment entered by this court should not contain the above-referenced 
paragraph proposed by PacifiCorp. 
DATED this 19th day October 2010. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of October 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing TAX COMMISSION'S REPLY BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT, by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to each 
of the following: 
DA VID 1. CRAPO 
RICHARD 1. ARMSTRONG 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TEL. (801) 366-6060 
RJ U.S. Mail o Hand Delivery 
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested o Overnight Mail o Facsimile: o Other 
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On September 16, 2010, this Court filed its Memorandum of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law ("Memorandum"). In accordance with its Memorandum, the Court hereby 
enters judgment in favor of Petitioner PacifiCorp and against the Idaho State Tax Commission as 
follows: 
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner PacifiCorp be awarded judgment against Respondent 
Idaho State Tax Commission. The January 1, 2008 Estimated Idaho Valuation of $252,382,819 
JUDGMENT-l 
00084 
set forth in the Tax Commission's September 2,2008 Decision is erroneous. The Court hereby 
orders that the correct January 1, 2008 Estimated Idaho Valuation of Pacifi Corp's operating 
property is $230,680,003 as more fully explained in the Court's Memorandum. 
PacifiCorp is entitled to receive a refund of any property taxes it may have paid on a 
valuation of its operating property that was in excess of $230,680,003. The Tax Commission is 
directed to reallocate the $230,680,003 Estimated Idaho Valuation among the affected counties 
and to communicate that amount to the affected counties. 
PacifiCorp may then obtain a refund from each affected county for any property taxes it 
paid to such county that is in excess of its tax obligation for the respective allocable portion of 
the $230,680,003 allocated to such county. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 63-1305, the affected 
counties may pay PadfiCorp a refund of the taxes, credit the amount of the refund against taxes 
due in the following year, or use a combination of a payment and a credit. Regardless of the 
method used by the Counties to effectuate the payment, the refund or credit shall include interest 
at the statutory rate. 
The Tax Commission is also ordered to pay PacifiCorp an amount equal to the cos\S 
tt t:4 .ex u;;:;r It.ilb-u.4li ~ '5 /a.L~ ""- ,vU.(. (C1) C) 
PacifiC9rp incurred to secure this judgmen1j.. The amount of such costs shall be established by 
.h(¥\~\'f (&PC) 
the filing of a cost memorandum and in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth in 
,A 
Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
JUDGMENT-2 
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DATED this .-ad:; ~C5ti/~~~, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
'--.;:::.7)' J(JkCA-~ 
Honorable George D. Carey 
Fourth District Court 
JUDGMENT-3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \~ of October, 2010, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing JUDG,MENTwas mailed in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Lawrence G. Allen 
Deputy Attorney General 
954 W. Jefferson, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Erick M. Shaner 
Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
P.O. Box 36 
Boise, Idaho 83722-0410 
Richard J. Armstrong 
David J. Crapo 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 500 




STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
LAWRENCE G. ALLEN, ISB #6137 
ERICK M. SHANER, ISB #5214 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 854-8073 
Attorneys for Respondent! Appellant. 
NO 
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CASE NO.: CV-OC-08-18158 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE PETITIONER, PACIFICORP, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, 
RICHARD J. ARMSTONG AND DAVID J. CRAPO; AND TO THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Idaho State Tax Commission appeals against PacifiCorp to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on October 19,2010, by 
the Honorable George Carey. The Judgment followed a bench trial over which Judge Carey 
presided. 
00088 
~ NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 ORIGINAL 
2. The Idaho State Tax Commission has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The Judgment described in paragraph 1 above may be appealed pursuant to Rules 1 I (a)(l) 
and 1 1 (a)(2), LA.R. 
3. The issues on appeal in this case are preliminarily stated as follows: 
a. Whether the district court erred in issuing a judgment against the 
involved counties when the counties were not parties to the district 
court action; 
b. Whether the district court erred in revising the equalized valuation 
of PacifiCorp's operating property set by the Idaho State Tax 
Commission, (sitting as the State Board of Equalization), for Idaho 
property tax purposes without considering evidence of 
equalization; 
c. Whether the district court erred in applying a preponderance of 
evidence burden of persuasion rather than the clear and convincing 
standard established by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
d. Whether the district court erred in allowing PacifiCorp to raise a 
new issue at trial regarding flotation costs adjustments to the 
income approach of valuation when PacifiCorp failed to raise the 
issue when it appeared before the State Board of Equalization; 
e. Whether the district court erred in allowing PacifiCorp to raise a 
new issue at trial regarding the weighting and reconciliation of the 
cost and income approaches to valuation, when PacifiCorp failed 
to raise the issue before the State Board of Equalization, and 
moreover PacifiCorp conceded at the hearing before the State 
Board of Equalization that the weighting and reconciliation of the 
approaches to valuation should not be changed if the approaches to 
valuation were adjusted; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 00089 
f. 
g. 
Whether the district court's conclusions oflaw were erroneous; 
Whether the district court erred when it failed to consider evidence 
of the recent sales price of PacifiCorp's operating property and 
other relevant market data when the district court established a new 
appraised value for the operating property; 
h. Whether the district court erred in failing to consider the 
unrebutted testimony of the Tax Commission's expert that the 
excess sales price booked as goodwill for regulatory purposes was 
not goodwill for valuation purposes, but rather a component of the 
sales price of the operating property for which regulators did not 
want PacifiCorp to earn a rate of return; 
1. Whether the district court erred when it reduced the cost approach 
to valuation by the amount of economic obsolescence claimed by 
PacifiCorp; 
J. Whether the district court erred when it reduced the value 
established by the Tax Commission under the income approach to 
valuation; 
k. Whether the district court erred in not affirming the decision of the 
Idaho State Tax Commission in its entirety. 
Pursuant to Rule 17(f), LAR., the above listing of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Idaho State Tax Commission from asserting other issues on appeal. 
4. The district court entered an order sealing portions of the record. 
S. The Idaho State Tax Commission requests a transcript of the trial. 
6. In addition to those documents automatically included in the Clerk's record 
pursuant to Rule 28(a), LAR., the Tax Commission requests that the following documents be 
included in the Clerk's record: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 00090 
a. Trial exhibits; 
b. Memorandum of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law; 
c. Memorandum and Order concerning Motions in Limine; 
d. Protective Order Governing the Production and Use of 
Confidential Documents and Information; 
e. Proposed Judgment submitted by PacifiCorp on September 28, 
2010; 
f Motion in Objection to Proposed Judgment; 
g. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Objection to Proposed 
Judgment; 
h. PacifiCorp memorandum in response to Tax Commission's motion 
in objection to proposed judgment; 
1. Revised proposed judgment submitted by PacifiCorp on 
October 14, 2010; 
J. Tax Commission reply brief in Objection to Proposed Judgment 
7. As attorney for the Appellant, Idaho State Tax Commission, I certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
b. The Tax Commission has requested a transcript of the trial; 
therefore it is necessary for the Tax Commission to pay the 
transcription fee. 
c. The Tax Commission is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because the State ofIdaho and its officers 
are exempt from paying such fees under Idaho Code §§ 31-3212 
and 67-2301. 
d. The Tax Commission is exempt from paying the appellate filing 
fee because the State of Idaho and its officers are exempt from 
paying such fees under Idaho Code §§ 31-3212 and 67-2301. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 00091. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R.. 
Dated this 24th day of November 2010. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 00092 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that .on this 24th day of November 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregomg by the following method to: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
WOOD JENKINS LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
DAVID J CRAPO 
CRAPO/SMITH PLLC 
299 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
VANESSA GOSNEY 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
LESLIE ANDERSON 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
PENNY TARDIFF 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
KIM MADSEN 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
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~U.S.Mail o Hand Delivery o Overnight Mail 
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LA WRENCE WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief of Civil Litigation 
LAWRENCE G. ALLEN, ISB #6137 
ERICK M. SHANER, ISB #5214 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 854-8073 
Attorneys for Respondent! Appellant. 
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orc 1 3 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARfi1iQ 
By KATHy BIEHl' Qe,a 
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CASE NO.: CV-OC-08-18158 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE PETITIONER, PACIFICORP, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, 
RICHARD J. ARMSTONG AND DAVID J. CRAPO; AND TO THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The Idaho State Tax Commission appeals against PacifiCorp to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on October 19,2010, by 
the Honorable George Carey. The Judgment followed a bench trial over which Judge Carey 
presided. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 00094 
2. The Idaho State Tax Commission has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The Judgment described in paragraph 1 above may be appealed pursuant to Rules I 1 (a)(l) 
and 11(a)(2), I.A.R. 
3. The issues on appeal in this case are preliminarily stated as follows: 
a. Whether the district court erred in issuing a judgment against the 
involved counties when the counties were not parties to the district 
court action; 
b. Whether the district court erred in revising the equalized valuation 
of PacifiCorp's operating property set by the Idaho State Tax 
Commission, (sitting as the State Board of Equalization), for Idaho 
property tax purposes without considering evidence of 
equalization; 
c. Whether the district court erred in applying a preponderance of 
evidence burden of persuasion rather than the clear and convincing 
standard established by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
d. Whether the district court erred in allowing PacifiCorp to raise a 
new issue at trial regarding flotation costs adjustments to the 
income approach of valuation when PacifiCorp failed to raise the 
issue when it appeared before the State Board of Equalization; 
e. Whether the district court erred in allowing PacifiCorp to raise a 
new issue at trial regarding the weighting and reconciliation of the 
cost and income approaches to valuation, when PacifiCorp failed 
to raise the issue before the State Board of Equalization, and 
moreover PacifiCorp conceded at the hearing before the State 
Board of Equalization that the weighting and reconciliation of the 
approaches to valuation should not be changed if the approaches to 
valuation were adjusted; 
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f. 
g. 
Whether the district court's conclusions oflaw were erroneous; 
Whether the district court erred when it failed to consider evidence 
of the recent sales price of PacifiCorp's operating property and 
other relevant market data when the district court established a new 
appraised value for the operating property; 
h. Whether the district court erred in failing to consider the 
unrebutted testimony of the Tax Commission's expert that the 
excess sales price booked as goodwill for regulatory purposes was 
not goodwill for valuation purposes, but rather a component of the 
sales price of the operating property for which regulators did not 
want PacifiCorp to earn a rate ofretum; 
1. Whether the district court erred when it reduced the cost approach 
to valuation by the amount of economic obsolescence claimed by 
PacifiCorp; 
J. Whether the district court erred when it reduced the value 
established by the Tax Commission under the income approach to 
valuation; 
k. Whether the district court erred in not affirming the decision of the 
Idaho State Tax Commission in its entirety. 
Pursuant to Rule 17(f), LA.R., the above listing of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
Idaho State Tax Commission from asserting other issues on appeal. 
4. The district court entered an order sealing portions of the record. 
5. The Idaho State Tax Commission requests a transcript of the trial. The trial was 
conducted on July 12, 14, 15, 16 and 19, 2010. See court reporters listed in the Certificate of 
Service. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 00096 
6. In addition to those documents automatically included in the Clerk's record 
pursuant to Rule 28(a), LA.R., the Tax Commission requests that the following documents be 
included in the Clerk's record: 
a. Trial exhibits; 
b. Memorandum of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law; 
c. Memorandum and Order concerning Motions in Limine; 
d. Protective Order Governing the Production and Use of 
Confidential Documents and Information; 
e. Proposed Judgment submitted by PacifiCorp on September 28, 
2010; 
f. Motion in Objection to Proposed Judgment; 
g. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Objection to Proposed 
Judgment; 
h. PacifiCorp memorandum in response to Tax Commission's motion 
in objection to proposed judgment; 
1. Revised proposed judgment submitted by PacifiCorp on 
October 14,2010; 
J. Tax Commission reply brief in Obj ection to Proposed Judgment 
7. As attorney for the Appellant, Idaho State Tax Commission, I certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
b. The Tax Commission has requested a transcript of the trial; 
therefore it is necessary for the Tax Commission to pay the 
transcription fee. 
c. The Tax Commission is exempt from paying the estimated fee for 
preparation of the record because the State of Idaho and its officers 
are exempt from paying such fees under Idaho Code §§ 31-3212 
and 67-2301. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 00097 
d. The Tax Commission is exempt from paying the appellate filing 
fee because the State of Idaho and its officers are exempt from 
paying such fees under Idaho Code §§ 31-3212 and 67-2301. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, LA.R.. 
Dated this 13th day of December, 2010. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 00098 
· . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of December, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
RICHARD J ARMSTRONG 
WOOD JENKINS LLC 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
DAVID J CRAPO 
CRAPO/SMITH PLLC 
299 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
VANESSA GOSNEY 
COURT REPORTER 
CIO ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
LESLIE ANDERSON 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
PENNY TARDIFF 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
KIM MADSEN 
COURT REPORTER 
C/O ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 WEST FRONT STREET 
BOISE, ID 83702-7300 
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NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on February 16, 2011, I 
lodged a transcript 224 pages of length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District. 
HEARING DATES INCLUDED: 
Trial Day One, July 12, 2010 
Vanessa S. Gosney, Official Court Reporter 
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I lodged a transcript of 428 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District. 
Le le Anderson, Official Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PACIFICORP, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38307 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to 
the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Petitioner's Exhibit # 23 - Rebuttal Report by Norman Ross. 
2. Petitioner's Exhibit # 25 - Sequential Slides Showing Corrections. 
3. Petitioner's Exhibit # 28 - Demonstrative Exhibits Prepared by Mr. Ross. 
4. Defendant's Exhibit # 515 - Brent Eyre, ASA, Review Appraisal. 
5. Defendant's Exhibit # 516 - PACIFICORP 2008 thru 2017 Ten Year Plan. 
6. Defendant's Exhibit # 522 - MidAmerica Asset Valuation Memorandum. 
7. Defendant's Exhibit # 527 -Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit. 
8. Defendant's Exhibit # 528 - Brent Eyre lllustrative Exhibit. 
9. Defendant's Exhibit # 530 - Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court 
this 14th day of April, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD 
CLERK: KATHY JOHNSON 
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Counsel for Defendant: Allen Lawrence 
PETITIONER EXHIBITS 
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2 SEC Form 10-K dated 12-31-07 
3 FERC Form 1 dated 12-31-07 
4 2008 Appraisal Report dated 6-16-08 
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6 Decision of Id State Tax Com dated 9-2-08 
7 Resume Norman Ross 
8 Map of Pacificorp's Operating System 
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10 Rudd's cost approach value implies about ROE 
11 Rudd's system value implies about ROE 
12 PowerPoint presentation by Mr. Norman Ross 
13 Pacificorp Book Depreciation Study of 12-31-06 















16 2008 Equity Yield Rates by St Tax Jurisdiction 7-12-10 
17 Resume of Steven R. McDougal 
19 ID Property Tax Appeal Revenue 
7-12-10 
7-12-10 
20 Appraisal of Pacificorp property as of 1-1-08 7-14-10 
21 Temporary Certified Permit for Thomas Tegarden 7-14-10 
22 Letter dated 6-23-10 prepared by Tegarden 7-14-10 
23 Rebuttal Report by Norman Ross 7-14-10 Sealed 
25 Sequential slides showing corrections 7-14-10 Sealed 
26 Per Share Market & Book Values 7-14-10 
28 Demonstrative exhibits prepared by Mr. Ross 
29 2008 Appraisal Report of Falls River 































31 Decision of ID State Tax Comm dated Aug 2005 
37 Review of MN Rules Chapter 8100 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 
500 Jerott Rudd's Resume 
505 ISTC 2008 Electric Yield Rate Study 
506 Tax Commission Slides by Jerott Rudd 
513 Brent Eyre Profession2l Qualifications 
514 Brent Eyre Idaho Appraisal License 
515 Brent Eyre, ASA, Review Appraisal 
516 Pacificorp 2008 thru 2017 Ten Year Plan 
522 MidAmerica asset valuation memorandum 
526 Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit 
527 Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit 
528 Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit 
529 Brent Eyre Illustrati'<"e Exhibit 
530 Brent Eyre Illustrative Exhibit 
532 Dr Ben Johnso~'s Professional Qualification 
533 Dr Ben Johnson report dated April IS, 2010 
534 Dr Ben Johnson Fxhibit 
535 Dr Ben Johnson Fxhibi t 
536 Dr Ben Johnson I' \1ib~ <-< 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PACIFICORP, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38307 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
LA WRENCE G. ALLEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: APR 192011 --------
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
DAVID J. CRAPO 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
~. 
By BAADlf!V Js THIES ~:.,,:."~~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
PACIFICORP, 
Supreme Court Case No. 38307 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
vs. CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
24th day of November, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ______________ ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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